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PROMOTING HEALTHCARE INNOVATION  
ON THE DEMAND SIDE 
 
Rebecca S. Eisenberg† & W. Nicholson Price II‡ 
 
ABSTRACT 
Innovation policy often focuses on the incentives of firms that sell new 
products. But optimal use of healthcare products also requires good 
information about the likely effects of products in different patients, and it is 
hard to provide the right incentives for producers to develop and disclose 
information that could limit future sales. Regulation partially fills this gap 
by requiring sellers to conduct clinical trials and report adverse events. But 
it is inherently problematic to rely on producers to supply negative 
information about their own products.  
Healthcare payers, however, can profit from avoiding inappropriate use 
of costly technologies. Recent technological advances enable insurers to 
innovate by analyzing their data about healthcare provision and outcomes. 
The federal government seeks to promote this sort of innovation through a 
series of initiatives; some picture insurers as passive data repositories, 
while others provide opportunities for insurers to innovate more directly.  
In this paper, we examine the role of health insurers in developing new 
knowledge about the provision of quality healthcare—what we call 
“demand-side innovation.” We address the contours of this underexplored 
area of innovation and describe the behavior of participating firms. We 
examine the legal rules surrounding privacy and their effects on this 
research, and consider the effect of market structures and intellectual 
property rules on incentives for demand-side innovation. Throughout, we 
highlight the multi-pronged way that government facilitates payer 
innovation, apart from the traditional tools of innovation policy.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Policy mechanisms to promote biopharmaceutical innovation often 
focus on fortifying incentives for firms to develop new products. 
Pharmaceutical firms favor exclusionary rights that defer competition, 
allowing them to profit by charging higher prices prior to generic entry. In 
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addition to providing patent term extensions for developers of new drugs,1 
Congress has repeatedly provided for periods of regulatory exclusivity to 
encourage the same firms to collect and submit data about the effects of 
their products in patients.2 Providing better information about these effects 
is an important form of innovation that distinguishes warfarin as a 
therapeutic anti-coagulant for use in humans from the same substance as rat 
poison.3 But it is problematic to rely on product-developing firms to provide 
this information, because although they might profit from favorable 
information, they stand to lose from disclosure of negative information 
about their own products. Regulatory mandates require sellers to produce 
data from rigorous clinical trials showing that their products are safe and 
effective as a condition for approval of new drugs.4 But side effects are 
difficult to observe in clinical trials of limited scope and duration. Often the 
bad news only comes to light after products have been widely used; if the 
news is bad enough it may lead to the withdrawal of previously approved 
products from the market.5 But the adverse events reporting system6 that 
FDA has long relied upon as its principal source of bad news after approval 
is haphazard and unreliable.7  
Healthcare payers,8 on the other hand, stand to profit from the bad news. 
Information that an expensive drug has harmful side effects, or that it does 
not work for many of the patients currently taking it, could lead to more 
sparing use of these products, reducing healthcare costs while improving 
quality of care. The incentives of payers to cut costs could be a 
                                                 
1 35 U.S.C. § 156. 
2 These provisions include five years of regulatory exclusivity for submitting data 
showing safety and efficacy for a new chemical entity, 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(F)(ii); three 
years for submitting data supporting a new use or product change that requires clinical 
trials, 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(F)(iv); twelve years for showing safety and efficacy for a new 
biologic, 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7); five years for showing safety and efficacy for a new 
qualified infectious disease product that targets any of a variety of resistant organisms, 21 
U.S.C. § 355f; and six months for submitting data from clinical trials in children, 21 U.S.C. 
§ 355a.  
3 Douglas Wardrop & David Keeling, The story of the discovery of heparin and 
warfarin, 141 BRITISH J. HAEMATOLOGY 757–763 (2008). 
4 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(b)(1)(A), 355(d). 
5 21 U.S.C. § 355(e). 
6 21 C.F.R. § 314.80. 
7 See, e.g., Fontanarosa PB et al., Postmarketing Surveillance—Lack of Vigilance, 
Lack of Trust, 292 J. AM. MED. ASSOC. 2647 (2004). 2007 legislation gave FDA greater 
powers and duties with respect to monitoring and disclosing postapproval risks, including 
authority to establish the Sentinel system discussed in greater detail infra in Part II.B.2. 
8 We use the term “payer” to refer to third parties who pay for health treatment. The 
term includes private insurers, public payers like Medicare and Medicaid, and integrated 
health systems like Kaiser Permanente that provide both care and insurance. 
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counterweight to the incentives of product sellers to maximize their own 
patent-protected profits.  
Recent advances in information technology and genomics have put 
healthcare payers in an excellent position to play a larger role in future 
innovation to improve healthcare through better understanding of the effects 
of medical treatment. Insurance companies and integrated healthcare 
providers have custody of a treasure trove of data about healthcare 
provision and outcomes that can yield valuable insights about how to 
improve the quality of healthcare and lower its costs. Some integrated 
healthcare systems have seized upon this advantage to make notable 
discoveries about the effects of particular products that have changed the 
standard of care.  
Studying the consequences of past clinical care to improve healthcare 
practice is an important research frontier with the potential to yield valuable 
innovations. Although it is easier to recognize innovation when a new 
product is introduced than when new information leads to more sparing use 
or even withdrawal of existing products from the market, in both cases new 
knowledge is put to use to improve the quality of healthcare. Both are 
socially valuable forms of innovation. But the distribution of benefits from 
the two forms of innovation is quite different. Much of the social value of 
new products accrues to product sellers, at least when they are protected 
from competition by patents and regulatory exclusivity. On the other hand, 
when further knowledge leads to more parsimonious use of existing 
products, the benefit is captured on the demand side by payers and by 
patients who save money and improve health by using less of these 
products.  
Healthcare payers enjoy several advantages that allow them to 
complement the role of product-developing firms as providers of 
information about the effects of healthcare products. First, payers have 
access to large volumes of data from administrative claims and healthcare 
records that reveal healthcare consequences. Second, payers have an 
incentive to reduce healthcare costs rather than to increase them, providing 
a counterweight to the incentives of product-developing firms. Third, the 
observational studies that payers can pursue are cheaper than the controlled 
clinical trials that swell the R&D budgets of product-developing firms. 
Fourth, although randomized, controlled clinical trials have long been 
considered the gold standard for studying treatment effects free of selection 
bias, healthcare records may provide much larger datasets and observations 
over longer periods of time, and can thus shed light on questions that 
clinical trials leave unresolved. 
The standard policy toolkit for promoting biomedical innovation offers 
little in the way of direct benefits to these “demand side innovators,” 
5
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although the exclusive rights that the legal system awards to developers of 
new products may give payers an indirect incentive to learn more about 
whether these products are worth their high costs. Rather than providing 
payers with their own exclusive rights, the federal government has used a 
variety of different mechanisms to promote the use of data from healthcare 
records as a source of ongoing innovation. These mechanisms include 
agency initiatives to use healthcare records for regulatory and research 
purposes, such as FDA’s Sentinel System and NIH’s eMERGE consortium. 
They also include new legislation to support these initiatives9 and agency 
rulemaking to address obstacles to research use of healthcare records.10 
Although some of these initiatives picture payers primarily as repositories 
of data that others might analyze, they also provide opportunities for 
insurers to become more fully engaged as partners in healthcare innovation. 
Healthcare payers engage in medical innovation to an extent that is largely 
unrecognized in the legal scholarship on innovation. Nevertheless, they 
could potentially do much more.  
This paper proceeds in three Parts. In Part I, we address the contours of 
this underexplored area of innovation, and describe the resources and 
opportunities available to payers. We show how payers are unable to claim 
rewards for pursuing those opportunities from the usual IP toolkit of patents 
and trade secrecy. Part II considers technical obstacles to medical 
innovation by payers, focusing on the challenges of making payer data 
useful for research, and government initiatives that have helped the industry 
begin to address those challenges. In Part III, we examine legal privacy 
barriers to using and assembling information, and administrative and 
legislative avenues to lowering those barriers. Throughout, we highlight the 
multi-pronged way that government facilitates payer innovation without 
relying on exclusionary rights. Although these “demand side innovators” do 
not directly benefit from the exclusionary rights favored by pharmaceutical 
firms, they have nonetheless benefited from a variety of government 
initiatives that have lowered the legal and technical barriers to innovation 
while building collaborative networks to share information and expertise. 
 
                                                 
9 See, e.g., the Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. 110-
85, 121 Stat. 823; the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health 
(HITECH) Act of 2009, enacted under Title XIII of the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115; the Affordable Care Act of 2010, 
Pub. L. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119; and the Food and Drug Administration Safety and 
Innovation Act of 2012, Pub. L. 112-144. 
10 See, e.g., recent HHS modifications to the HIPAA Privacy Rule, discussed infra Part 
III.C. 
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I. INNOVATION BY HEALTH-CARE PAYERS 
 
While payers may lack the scientific labs of pharmaceutical companies 
and the front-line patient interactions of practicing physicians, they have 
access to valuable health data that can shed light on questions about what 
works in different clinical contexts and in different kinds of patients. These 
data give payers an advantage in innovation to improve the choice of 
appropriate treatments. This Part describes the innovation landscape for 
payers. It begins by giving two examples of payer innovation that fit poorly 
in a regulatory regime that was designed for the use of product-developing 
firms. Next, it briefly canvasses the innovation resources and opportunities 
available to payers, with a focus on research questions that payers might be 
better positioned to address than product-developing firms. It concludes by 
considering the standard toolkit of innovation incentives from the 
perspective of innovating payers.  
 
A.  Examples 
 
Two extended examples highlight both the potential benefits of payer 
innovation and the limited opportunities for payers to inform regulatory 
decisions in a legal regime designed for innovation by drug-developing 
firms. The first involves a request by payers to FDA to switch the terms of 
approval for the antihistamines Allegra, Claritin, and Zyrtec from 
prescription (Rx) to over-the-counter (OTC) sales. The second tells the 
story of the painkiller Vioxx, and illustrates the reluctance of FDA to use 
data from payer records rather than from drug company clinical trials to 
establish toxic side effects in a previously approved product. It is no 
coincidence that both involve widely prescribed, patent-protected 
blockbuster products that were costing payers a lot of money. 
 
1. Rx-to-OTC Switch: Non-sedating antihistamines 
  
The first example illustrates the divergent interests of payers and drug 
manufacturers in the context of regulatory approval for switching drugs 
from prescription (Rx) to OTC sales.11 An Rx-to-OTC switch can be a 
                                                 
11 The Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act provides that a drug which “is not safe for use 
except under the supervision of a practitioner licensed by law to administer such drug” or 
which is limited by the terms of its regulatory approval to use under the professional 
supervision of such a practitioner shall be dispensed by prescription only. 21 U.S.C. § 
353(b). For a discussion of how FDA implements the distinction between Rx and OTC 
drugs, see Holly M. Spencer, The Rx-to-OTC Switch of Claritin, Allegra, and Zyrtec: An 
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significant cost-lowering innovation for at least two reasons.12 First, it 
permits patients to treat themselves without incurring the costs and delays 
associated with seeing a doctor for a prescription. Second, it often leads to a 
significant price reduction for the drug itself, because health insurance 
typically covers Rx but not OTC drugs and cost-sensitive patients may be 
unwilling to pay the high prices that drug companies charge insurance 
companies.13  
In 1998, Blue Cross of California (later Wellpoint) submitted a petition 
to FDA asking it to permit OTC sales of nonsedating antihistamines sold 
under the brand names Allegra, Claritin, and Zyrtec.14 Blue Cross/Wellpoint 
argued that nonsedating antihistamines were safer than older antihistamines, 
already available OTC, which had significant sedative side effects. 
According to the petition, the lack of OTC access to the safer nonsedating 
products “results in a greater incidence of side effects associated with the 
OTC alternatives adding considerable unnecessary medical costs to the 
health care system.” Of course, the switch would also save costs for Blue 
Cross/Wellpoint by allowing patients to purchase their own nonsedating 
antihistamines out of their own pockets in the OTC market rather than using 
insurance to pay for doctor visits and prescriptions. 
                                                                                                                            
Unprecedented FDA Response to Petitioners and the Protection of Public Health, 51 AM. 
U. L. REV. 999, 1011-18 (2002). 
12 For an estimate of cost savings from the availability of OTC drugs, see Consumer 
Healthcare Products Ass’n, The Value of OTC Medicine to the United States (2012), 
http://www.chpa.org/ValueofOTCMeds2012.aspx (estimating drug cost savings of 
approximately $25 billion per year and clinical visit cost savings of approximately $66 
billion per year). Because drug companies often seek an Rx-to-OTC switch at the same 
time that they lose patent protection for a drug, it is not always clear how much of a price 
reduction is a consequence of the switch itself and how much is a result of competition 
following the loss of patent protection. At a minimum one would expect the lower costs of 
dispensing OTC products relative to that for Rx products to lead to some price reduction. 
On the other hand, from the perspective of consumers, the out-of-pocket cost of an OTC 
drug may exceed the out-of-pocket cost for the co-pay on a prescription drug that is 
otherwise covered by insurance. See Joshua P. Cohen, Cherie Paquette & Catherine P. 
Cairns, Switching prescription drugs to over the counter, 330 BRITISH MED. J. 39–41 
(2005) (concluding that switching drugs to OTC availability reduces insurers’ prescription 
drug costs but increases the costs for most patients); cf. Peter Temin, Realized Benefits 
from Switching Drugs, 35 J.L. & ECON. 351-369 (1992) (concluding that OTC switches 
have both reduced costs and increased consumer welfare).  
13 Cohen et al., supra note 12 (noting in survey of 12 managed care organizations “a 
strong tendency to remove switched drugs from the formulary and raise copayments of 
prescription drugs in the same class” following an OTC switch). 
14 Letter dated July 21, 1998 from Robert C. Seidman to Dockets Management Branch, 
Food & Drug Admin., Docket 98P-0610 (1998), http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/
dockets/98p0610/cp00001.pdf.  
8
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The product manufacturers opposed the switch, arguing that Blue 
Cross/Wellpoint had failed to submit adequate supporting data to establish 
the safety and efficacy of the nonsedating products when used without the 
supervision of a physician.15 While it may seem odd for product 
manufacturers to warn regulators about the potential hazards of their 
products, in this case it was entirely consistent with their own financial 
interests. Drug manufacturers typically wait to seek approval for an Rx-to-
OTC switch until the drug approaches the end of its patent life, when 
generic competition is about to erode profits. At that point, the firm may 
seek to mitigate the loss of revenue by invoking a statutory incentive of 
exclusivity for conducting further clinical trials to support a change in the 
terms of regulatory approval.16 If further clinical trials are “essential” to 
FDA approval of an application for the switch, the manufacturer is entitled 
to three years of exclusivity before FDA will approve a generic product for 
OTC sales.17 This supplemental exclusivity gives the branded product a 3-
year head start in the OTC market. A switch prior to patent expiration 
would surrender more lucrative exclusivity in the Rx market in exchange 
for less lucrative exclusivity in the OTC market, and would hasten the 
arrival of full competition by allowing the OTC exclusivity to run during 
the patent term. But because the statute authorizes further exclusivity only if 
new clinical trials are essential for approval, and not if it is already apparent 
that the product is safe for OTC sale without further study, the 
manufacturers had to persuade FDA that more data were necessary to 
support the switch. In other words, the Blue Cross/Wellpoint petition not 
only threatened to end payer coverage of nonsedating antihistamines, but 
also undermined the case for three years of exclusivity in the OTC market.  
                                                 
15 See letter dated Jan. 15, 1999 from Alexander R. Jacquinto to Dockets Management 
Branch, Food & Drug Admin., Docket 98P-0610 (1999), http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/
dockets/dockets/98p0610/c000004.pdf; Schering Plough Research Institute, Briefing Book 
(April 12, 2001), http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/01/briefing/3737b_15_schering-
plough.pdf. 
16 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(E)(iii) 
17 The statute provides in pertinent part: 
If a supplement to [a previously approved new drug application or NDA] is 
approved after September 24, 1984, and the supplement contains reports of new 
clinical investigations … essential to the approval of the supplement and 
conducted or sponsored by the person submitting the supplement, [FDA] may not 
make the approval of an application submitted under this subsection [i.e., an 
Abbreviated New Drug Application seeking approval to market a generic version 
without having to repeat the showing of safety and efficacy in the original NDA] 
for a change approved in the supplement effective before the expiration of three 
years from the date of the approval of the supplement …. 
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(F)(iv). 
9
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FDA asked an advisory committee whether nonsedating antihistamines 
“could be used appropriately and safely by consumers without the 
intervention of a learned intermediary,”18 and the committee concluded that 
they could.19 But although FDA seemed to have the authority to make such 
a switch on the petition of a payer,20 it was unprecedented and controversial 
to grant such a petition over the objection of the drug manufacturer.21 The 
more traveled pathway was for the manufacturer to initiate an OTC switch 
by filing a supplemental new drug application at a time of its choosing. And 
sure enough, Schering-Plough filed its own application for an Rx-to-OTC 
switch for Claritin—the first of the nonsedating antihistamines to face 
patent expiration—eleven months after opposing the Blue Cross/Wellpoint 
petition on the ground that the data were insufficient to support such a 
switch.22 FDA approved the Schering-Plough application on November 27, 
2002, without ruling on the Blue Cross/Wellpoint petition.23 The patent 
protecting Claritin expired three weeks later.24 
This episode shows how the interest of payers in reducing healthcare 
costs diverges from the interest of product manufacturers in maximizing 
revenues, making payers more eager to pursue a cost-lowering innovation 
(such as an Rx-to-OTC switch) that a manufacturer would rather defer. The 
statutory incentive of regulatory exclusivity may eventually motivate a 
manufacturer to conduct clinical trials and to pursue an Rx-to-OTC switch 
just prior to patent expiration. But payers might find it worthwhile to pursue 
this innovation more promptly and without the need for propping up prices 
                                                 
18 Food & Drug Admin., FDA Overview of Issues for the Joint Nonprescription Drugs 
Advisory Committee and the Pulmonary-Allergy Drugs Advisory Committee (May 11, 
2001), http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/01/briefing/3737b_02_overview.pdf.  
19 Claritin Approval Marks Significant Shift in Rx-to-OTC Switches, 666 FOOD & 
DRUG LETTER, (Dec. 20, 2002), https://www.rahasia.biz/reading/claritin-approval-marks-
significant-shift-in-rx-to-otc-Myvf.html.  
20 The statute provides that FDA “may by regulation remove drugs … from the [Rx 
only] requirements when such requirements are not necessary for the protection of the 
public health.” 21 U.S.C. § 353(b)(3). FDA regulations authorize either the FDA 
Commissioner or “any interested person” to petition for a switch:  
A proposal to exempt a drug from the prescription-dispensing requirements of 
section 503(b)(1)(C) of the act may be initiated by the Commissioner or by any 
interested person. Any interested person may file a petition seeking such 
exemption, which petition may be pursuant to part 10 of this chapter [which 
governs citizen petitions such as that submitted by Blue Cross/Wellpoint], or in 
the form of a supplement to an approved new drug application.”  
21 C.F.R. § 310.200(b). 
21 See id.; Spencer, supra note 11. 
22 Spencer, supra note 11, at 1023–24. 
23 Melody Peterson, Claritin to Sell Over the Counter, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 28, 2002). 
24 Id. 
10
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through regulatory exclusivity. Moreover, because they do not stand to gain 
from persuading FDA that costly clinical trials are necessary to support a 
switch, payers may be willing to show safety at lower cost by consulting 
their own data generated from clinical experience with the drug without 
unnecessary clinical trials.25  
 
2. Post-Approval Studies 
 
The second example concerns exposure of a toxic side effect of the 
blockbuster drug Vioxx through research in health records of the integrated 
healthcare provider Kaiser Permanente. Vioxx is a selective Cox-2 
inhibitive non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drug (NSAID) for relieving pain 
and inflammation without the gastric side effects of an earlier generation of 
NSAIDs (such as aspirin and ibuprofen).26 The manufacturer Merck 
voluntarily withdrew Vioxx from the market in the fall of 2004, at a time 
when it was selling $2.5 billion per year, in the face of mounting evidence 
that Vioxx was causing fatal heart attacks.27  
Data from Merck-sponsored clinical trials comparing Vioxx to naproxen 
(one of the older generation of NSAIDs) had previously shown more heart 
attacks (as well as fewer gastric side effects28)in patients taking Vioxx29, 
but Merck had argued that the difference in heart attacks reflected a 
protective effect of naproxen rather than a toxic effect of Vioxx.30 FDA was 
not convinced,31 and Merck agreed to provide warnings about 
cardiovascular risks while it continued to monitor cardiovascular safety in 
                                                 
25 The data submitted by Blue Cross/Wellpoint primarily concerned the risks posed by 
the sedating effects of the earlier antihistamines that were already available in the OTC 
market, including a study from the National Transportation Safety Board of deaths from 
traffic accidents involving drivers who had used sedating antihistamines. Id. at 1019–1021.  
26 See Statement of Sandra Kweder, M.D., Deputy Director, Office of New Drugs, 
Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., before the Senate 
Comm. On Finance, (Nov. 18 2004) [Kweder testimony], http://www.fda.gov/newsevents/
testimony/ucm113235.htm.  
27 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., VIOXX (ROFECOXIB) QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS (Sept. 
30, 2004), http://www.fda.gov/drugs/drugsafety/
postmarketdrugsafetyinformationforpatientsandproviders/ucm106290.htm. 
28 See Claire Bombardier et al., Comparison of Upper Gastrointestinal Toxicity of 
Rofecoxib and Naproxen in Patients with Rheumatoid Arthritis, 343 N. ENG. J. MED. 1520–
28 (2000). 
29 See Memorandum from Shari L. Targum to Sandra Cook re Consultation NDA 21-
042, S-007 Review of cardiovascular safety database (Feb. 1, 2001), http://www.fda.gov/
ohrms/dockets/ac/01/briefing/3677b2_06_cardio.pdf. 
30 Id., at 1526–27. 
31 Memorandum from Shari L. Targum, supra note 29, at 34–35. 
11
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additional clinical trials of Vioxx for new indications.32 Meanwhile, 
millions of patients took Vioxx, many of whom were at low risk of gastric 
side effects and could have received the same benefits at less risk and at 
lower cost from one of the older nonselective NSAIDs.33 
While Merck’s clinical trials proceeded, Dr. David Graham from the 
FDA Office of Drug Safety began a collaborative study with Kaiser 
Permanente comparing health records of patients who took Vioxx with 
those who took other NSAIDs. That study showed significantly more heart 
attacks in the Vioxx patients,34 leading Kaiser Permanente to reconsider 
whether to provide coverage of Vioxx.35 But according to Dr. Graham’s 
Congressional testimony, FDA sought to suppress publication of the 
study.36 Dr. Graham explained that FDA’s primary institutional mission is 
approving new drugs, not re-evaluating already approved drugs. Moreover, 
FDA has long favored clinical trials over observational studies.37 Both of 
these factors favor reliance on the data submitted by drug companies over 
that coming from other sources with different motivations.  
In the case of Vioxx, the same cardiovascular effects that showed up in 
the Kaiser Permanente data were becoming too clear to overlook even in 
data from ongoing Merck clinical trials.38 Shortly after the Kaiser 
                                                 
32 Kweder testimony, supra note 26. 
33 Carolanne Dai et al., National Trends in Cyclooxygenase-2 Inhibitor Use Since 
Market Release: Nonselective Diffusion of a Selectively Cost-effective Innovation, 165 
ARCH. INTERN. MED. 171-177 (2005). Merck later paid substantial criminal fines for 
“misbranding” Vioxx by promoting and marketing it beyond the scope of FDA-approved 
uses. U.S. Justice Dept. Press Release, U.S. Pharmaceutical Company Merck Sharp & 
Dohme Sentenced in Connection with Unlawful Promotion of Vioxx (April 19, 2012), 
http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/CriminalInvestigations/ucm301329.htm. 
34 Kweder testimony, supra note 26; David J. Graham et al., Risk of acute myocardial 
infarction and sudden cardiac death in patients treated with cyclooxygenase-2 selective 
and nonselective non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs: nested case-control study, 365 
LANCET 475–481 (2005). 
35 Anna Wilde Matthews & Scott Hensley, Big HMO Reconsiders Vioxx After Study 
Points to Heart Risks, WALL ST. J. (August 26, 2004), http://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB109346588678101103?cb=logged0.44817835511639714.  
36 Testimony of David J. Graham before the Senate Finance Committee (Nov. 18, 
2004), http://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/111804dgtest.pdf. According to Dr. 
Graham’s testimony, the Director of the FDA Office of New Drugs sent him an email 
suggesting that “since FDA was ‘not contemplating’ a warning against the use of high-dose 
Vioxx, my conclusions should be changed,” id. at 3. 
37 Id. at 4. 
38 Robert S. Bresalier et al., Cardiovascular Events Associated with Rofecoxib in a 
Colorectal Adenoma Chemoprevention Trial, 352 N. ENG. J. MED. 1092–1102 (2005). The 
Merck-sponsored study was designed primarily to show that Vioxx was effective in 
preventing recurrent colon polyps rather than to measure cardiovascular side effects. 
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Permanente data were presented at an international conference, Merck 
voluntarily agreed to withdraw Vioxx from the market,39 and under the 
intense glare of Congressional and media attention, FDA allowed Dr. 
Graham to publish the Kaiser-Permanente study in a leading medical 
journal.40 Once again, FDA took no action until the drug manufacturer 
came around to the same conclusion as the payer. 
The Vioxx episode showed the potential of large-scale observational 
studies to illuminate questions that were left ambiguous in data from drug 
company clinical trials. Healthcare payers have the necessary data for 
observational studies and face different incentives than drug companies. 
The availability of data that is not controlled by the drug companies opens 
the door to analysis that is free of the possible distortions and wishful 
thinking of a company that is making billions of dollars a year selling a 
blockbuster product. FDA has long treated data from clinical trials as 
proprietary information belonging to the drug company that paid for the 
trials, and has therefore prevented public scrutiny of the data. But data from 
patient health records are not under the proprietary control of the drug 
companies and could be analyzed by other parties with different interests, 
such as Kaiser Permanente and its collaborators. 
 
B.  Resources 
 
Payers possess tremendous amounts of valuable health data about 
individuals. At this time, the longest-term and most readily available form 
of payer data is administrative claims data. These data include the 
information necessary to process payment claims, providing a view of 
medical encounters over time. Administrative claims data typically record 
diagnoses and treatments for patients, hospital admissions and releases, tests 
performed and their results, prescriptions filled, and professional services 
provided, as well as demographic information about patients (such as age, 
sex, and location) and the identities of providers.41 
Payers also frequently have access to other data sources that can 
supplement administrative claims data. They typically have prescription 
payment records that reveal when patients actually pick up and pay for 
drugs (as opposed to merely getting the prescription), and when they refill 
                                                 
39 Kweder testimony, supra note 26 
40 Thomas H. Maugh II, Banned Report on Vioxx Published, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 25, 
2005), http://articles.latimes.com/2005/jan/25/science/sci-vioxx25.  
41 Sebastian Schneeweiss & Jerry Avorn, A Review of Uses of Health Care Utilization 
Databases for Epidemiologic Research on Therapeutics, 58 J. CLIN. EPIDEMIOL. 323, 323 
(2005). 
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prescriptions. Payers typically know when patients are referred to 
specialists and why. They may have access to laboratory test results under 
contracts with laboratory test providers, especially when tests are performed 
by major national providers rather than in-house.42  
In addition, it is increasingly common for payers to have access to 
patient medical records generated by doctors and other caregivers. These 
records can provide richer data on treatment and outcomes than 
administrative claims data, although analyzing them can be challenging due 
to variability across providers in what is included and how they are 
written.43 
Integrated health systems that combine the functions of payer, health 
care coordinator, and health care provider are particularly likely to have 
access to medical records. Notable examples of integrated health systems 
include Kaiser Permanente;44 Geisinger;45 Highmark; Intermountain 
Healthcare;46 and the Departments of Defense and Veterans Affairs.47 In the 
Kaiser system, for example, members pay premiums to Kaiser and see 
doctors who are Kaiser employees in Kaiser offices or hospitals.48 
Integrated health systems may have centralized custody of records that are 
otherwise likely to be dispersed across multiple custodians in other parts of 
the healthcare system, reducing the need to gather data from multiple 
sources.49 In the overall health system, a relatively small fraction of patients 
belong to integrated health systems, but these systems have been important 
participants in research to date using data from electronic health records.50 
Payers may use these data for their own research, provide them to other 
                                                 
42 Conversations with anonymous industry members and consultants. 
43 For a more detailed discussion of challenges with patient medical records, see infra 
Part II.A 
44 See www.kaiserpermanente.org 
45 See www.geisinger.org, www.highmark.com 
46 See www.intermountainhealthcare.org 
47 The Department of Defense’s Tricare offers healthcare to 9.2 million eligible 
military personnel and families. http://www.tricare.mil/stakeholders/statistics.cfm. The 
Veterans Administration provides medical care to veterans and had 8.9 million enrollees in 
2013. http://www.va.gov/HEALTHPOLICYPLANNING/enroll02/Fnl925Doc.pdf. 
48 See RICKEY HENDRICKS, A MODEL FOR NATIONAL HEALTH CARE: THE HISTORY OF 
KAISER PERMANENTE (1993). 
49 In integrated health systems, data formats and the difference between claims data 
and clinical data may differ from typical payer-only systems since claims data are not 
needed to actually pay claims, but rather for internal accounting and measurement 
purposes. 
50 Integrated health systems are not the only way to integrate; some entities, like Cal 
INDEX, are allowing payers to overcome barriers to integrate data without working in an 
integrated system. See infra notes 143–149 and accompanying text. 
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researchers, or enter into collaborations with others to use the data for 
innovation.51 
 
C.  Opportunities 
 
Payers have the opportunity and incentive to engage in valuable forms 
of innovation that are under-provided by other innovators. Innovation based 
on payer data can improve the quality of care and decrease costs, potentially 
giving innovating firms competitive advantages and increased profits.52 In 
particular, payers stand to benefit from innovation to identify harmful 
effects of treatment and to compare different treatment options. This 
includes both traditional comparative effectiveness research and new 
research in personalized medicine enabled by advances in genomics and 
information technology. Payer innovation efforts like United Health’s 
Optum53 or Anthem’s HealthCore54 conduct both internal research and 
external work for other entities like pharmaceutical companies or other 
payers.55 This innovation offers potential benefits for patients and payers 
alike.  
 
1. Drug toxicity 
 
Drugs frequently have a wide range of side effects that have not yet 
been fully identified at the time they are initially approved for sale. Payers 
are especially well positioned to identify these side effects, which may 
sometimes change the determination that the drug is safe and effective. 
Side effects often go unnoticed before approval because of limitations in 
the clinical trial process. Clinical trials typically involve only a few 
thousand patients, and occur over the course of a few months to a few 
                                                 
51 Payers may either sell their data to nonpayers or enter into research collaborations 
with them. See, e.g., www.healthcore.com/academic (describing academic collaboration 
with Anthem’s HealthCore innovation unit and potential use of Anthem’s data). In 
addition, Medicare provides a rich dataset of health information about its enrollees, but the 
scope of research on those data is circumscribed by the fact that Medicare is largely 
available only to the elderly and some non-elderly with disabilities. 
52 Elsewhere, we discuss how various factors decrease insurer cost sensitivity, and 
acknowledge that these factors may decrease the incentive to innovate. See infra Part I.D.1. 
53 See Optum, About Us, https://www.optum.com/about.html (last visited July 16, 
2015) (“As a health services and innovation company, we combine data and analytics with 
technology and expertise to power modern health care.”). 
54 Healthcore, Home, www.healthcore.com (last visited Feb. 22, 2016). 
55 See, e.g., www.healthcore.com/government, /academics, /life-science-companies, 
and /payersproviders (listing opportunities for research and publications resulting from 
collaborations in various categories). 
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years.56 The relatively small test population means that drug developers are 
unlikely to observe toxicity that occurs only in a small fraction of patients, 
or in a population not included in the clinical trials.57 Enrollment criteria for 
clinical trials often exclude patients who are pregnant or are taking other 
medications, for example, and therefore provide no information about the 
effects of the study drug in these patients.58 Similarly the relatively short 
duration of clinical trials makes it difficult for developers to observe long-
term effects of the drug. As a result, one in five approved drugs later receive 
at least one new “black-box warning”—the strongest type of warning—after 
approval.59 Of the drugs that acquire black-box warnings after approval, it 
takes an average of 10 years before the effect is confirmed and the warning 
is added.60  
Once a drug has been approved and is in clinical use, payers begin to 
accumulate longer-term observational data that permit them to observe 
previously unnoticed drug toxicity effects. The Vioxx example illustrates 
the potential of this type of payer innovation. 
Payer records are not the only way to learn of post-approval drug 
toxicity. Side effects may become apparent in the course of further clinical 
trials by the seller of the drug, as happened in Merck’s clinical trial of 
Vioxx for a new indication.61 Drug manufacturers, doctors, and patients 
                                                 
56 In fact, drug developers have strong incentives to complete clinical trials as quickly 
as possible. Patents on the drug itself are typically filed very early in development, and the 
limited patent term means that time spent in clinical trials reduces the period of high-profit 
patent-protected sales. See ERIC BUDISH ET AL., DO FIXED PATENT TERMS DISTORT 
INNOVATION? EVIDENCE FROM CANCER CLINICAL TRIALS (National Bureau of Economic 
Research, 2013), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w19430 (finding that drug 
companies disproportionately focus on drugs with shorter clinical trial period times). 
57 See Jesse A. Berlin et al., Adverse Event Detection in Drug Development: 
Recommendations and Obligations Beyond Phase 3, 98 AM. J. PUBLIC HEALTH 1366 
(2008). 
58 See Marshall Godwin et al., Pragmatic Controlled Clinical Trials in Primary Care: 
The Struggle between External and Internal Validity, 3 BMC MED. RES. METHODOL. 28 
(2003); Greer Donley, Encouraging Maternal Sacrifice: How Regulations Governing the 
Consumption of Pharmaceuticals During Pregnancy Prioritize Fetal Safety over Maternal 
Health and Autonomy, NYU REV. L. & SOCIAL CHANGE 45 (2013). 
59 Sean Hennessy & Brian L. Strom, Improving Postapproval Drug Safety 
Surveillance: Getting Better Information Sooner, 55 ANNU. REV. PHARMACOL. TOXICOL. 
75, 76 (2015). 
60 Id. at 76. Short durations of clinical trials may also obscure the actual health 
outcomes of interest, Jonathan J. Darrow et al., New FDA Breakthrough-Drug Category — 
Implications for Patients, 370 N. ENGL. J. MED. 1252, 1253–54 (2014), a problem that can 
also potentially be addressed by innovating payers using longer-term data. 
61 See supra Part I.A.2. 
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may also report side effects to FDA.62 But this passive reporting system 
depends upon someone making a connection between the adverse event and 
the drug and going to the trouble of reporting it. Such reports are unlikely to 
provide information on increases in the frequency of otherwise common 
ailments, such as the cardiovascular side effects among patients who took 
Vioxx.63  
After the Vioxx episode, Congress fortified FDA’s authority to require 
drug manufacturers to conduct postmarket surveillance studies.64 At the 
same time, Congress directed FDA to establish a system for monitoring 
drug adverse events through use of health records, a mandate that FDA is 
implementing in its Sentinel program, discussed below.65 Other 
international health agencies have similar programs.66  
But while these programs give regulators access to data from a network 
of payers, the data can only answer the queries that are submitted to it. FDA 
continues to rely primarily on adverse event reports to identify new risks. 
Payers with an interest in lowering the costs and improving the quality of 
healthcare have an opportunity to play an active role in identifying 
appropriate queries by scrutinizing their own data for evidence of drug 
toxicity, either ahead of regulators or in partnership with them.  
  
2. Comparative effectiveness and cost-effectiveness 
 
Payers are in an excellent position to study the comparative 
effectiveness or cost-effectiveness of different treatment interventions. 
Comparative effectiveness research compares health outcomes for 
                                                 
62 FDA maintains these reports in a database called the FDA Adverse Event Reporting 
System (FAERS) that it monitors for evidence of potential safety concerns. Doctors and 
patients may voluntarily report adverse events directly to FDA at http://www.fda.gov/
Safety/MedWatch/, but the majority of voluntary information received by FDA comes 
through reports to drug manufacturers, which in turn must report adverse events to FDA. 
See 21 C.F.R. § 314.80, 21 U.S.C. § 355(k)(1) (requiring drug manufacturers to submit 
adverse event reports to FDA). 
63 Hennessy & Strom, supra note 59, at 77.  
64 Under the Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, FDA was given 
statutory authority to require postapproval studies or clinical trials if passive and active 
surveillance will be insufficient to address known or potential serious risks. FDAAA § 901, 
codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355(o); see also FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: 
POSTMARKETING STUDIES AND CLINICAL TRIALS—IMPLEMENTATION OF SECTION 505 
(O)(3) OF THE FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG, AND COSMETIC ACT (2011). These provisions are 
more fully discussed infra at Part II.B.2. 
65 See infra Part II.B.2. 
66 See Hennessy & Strom, supra note 59, at 79–81 (listing large government-sponsored 
adverse-event population-surveillance databases). 
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interventions; cost-effectiveness research further considers costs to 
determine which intervention buys more health for the money.67 Comparing 
the effects of different interventions is a valuable form of research that is 
often neglected in the premarket stage. Premarket clinical trials typically 
compare a new drug with a placebo rather than with another intervention, 
unless the drug developer seeks approval to make specific marketing claims 
of superiority to alternative treatments,68 and consequently provide little 
information about whether the new drug is better or worse than alternative 
treatments. Comparative effectiveness studies may involve clinical trials, in 
which researchers randomly assign patients to receive one drug or the other, 
or data-based observational studies, in which researchers observe 
differences in outcomes between matched populations of patients that 
received each course of treatment.  
Payers, both public and private, are in a good position to conduct 
comparative effectiveness research through observational studies. As 
previously noted, they have access to large datasets of patient records, 
including information about diagnoses and drug prescriptions and 
purchases.69 Although administrative claims data may not indicate how well 
the intervention worked (beyond such crude indicators as hospital 
readmissions), patient health records may include richer data about 
outcomes.  
Moreover, cost-sensitive payers have strong incentives to perform 
comparative effectiveness—and especially cost-effectiveness—research. 
Other performers of comparative effectiveness research face different 
                                                 
67 See Alan M. Garber & Harold C. Sox, The Role Of Costs In Comparative 
Effectiveness Research, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1805, 1807–09 (2010) (describing and comparing 
comparative effectiveness research and cost-effectiveness research). Exactly how to 
measure “more effective” or “more health” are knotty issues, which have spawned a major 
literature including the calculation of Quality-Adjusted Life Years (QALYs) and 
Disability-Adjusted Life Years (DALYs), global surveys of patient preferences, and many 
other techniques. See, e.g., Marthe R. Gold et al., HALYs and QALYs and DALYs, Oh My: 
Similarities and Differences in Summary Measures of Population Health, 23 ANNU. REV. 
PUBLIC HEALTH 115 (2002); Franco Sassi, Calculating QALYs, Comparing QALY and 
DALY Calculations, 21 HEALTH POL’Y PLAN. 402 (2006). We do not address these issues 
here. 
68 For example, when Merck developed Vioxx, it conducted clinical trials comparing 
the experience of patients taking Vioxx with those taking the older NSAID naproxen, and 
used those studies to support the marketing claim that Vioxx had fewer gastric side effects 
than naproxen. Claire Bombardier et al., Comparison of Upper Gastrointestinal Toxicity of 
Rofecoxib and Naproxen in Patients with Rheumatoid Arthritis, 343 N. ENG. J. MED. 1526–
27 (2000). See supra Part I.A.. 
69 See supra Part I.A. 
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incentives and constraints. Academic institutions,70 nonprofit 
organizations,71 and government-created comparative effectiveness 
institutes focus on public health goals rather than cost control. In fact, the 
Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute created by the Affordable 
Care Act is prohibited by statute from performing certain types of cost-
effectiveness research.72 These institutions generally need to partner with 
payers for access to data. Doctors and hospitals have some access to health 
data, although they too may find it advantageous to partner with payers to 
obtain access to larger datasets that include data from different providers. 
But doctors and hospital may have perverse incentives under a classical fee-
for-service model, because they make more money by providing more (and 
more expensive) treatments.73 Finally, drug companies have the capability 
to conduct comparative effectiveness research, through both clinical trials 
and observational studies, and an incentive to demonstrate that their new 
products are better than older drugs. However, this incentive is biased in 
one direction; comparative effectiveness research runs the risk of showing 
that a new drug is worse than existing treatments. Since placebo-controlled 
trials are generally enough to win regulatory approval, they may decide not 
to take the risk of demonstrating inferiority rather than superiority for the 
patent-protected product.  
Payers have different incentives, which could make them an important 
source of comparative effectiveness research and cost effectiveness 
research. For example, Mayo Clinic researchers used Optum Labs data to 
                                                 
70 For example, Harvard’s Comparative Effectiveness Research Initiative focuses on 
“public health and health systems interventions.” http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/
comparative-effectiveness-research-initiative/ 
71 For example, the Institute for Clinical and Economic Review’s New England 
Comparative Effectiveness Public Advisory Council, http://cepac.icer-review.org/, has 
produced comparative effectiveness reports on treatments for opioid dependence, type 2 
diabetes, and depression, as well as on the use of community health workers and on 
behavioral health integration into medical care. Comparative Effectiveness Public Advisory 
Council, Reports, http://cepac.icer-review.org/adaptations/ (last visited July 14, 2015). 
72 The Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute (PCORI) was created by the 
Affordable Care Act to conduct comparative effectiveness research. However, it is 
statutorily prohibited from certain types of cost-effectiveness research. PCORI “shall not 
develop or employ a dollars-per-quality adjusted life year . . . as a threshold to establish 
what type of health care is cost effective or recommended.” ACA § 6301, codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 1320e–1(e). But see Nicholas Bagley, Who says PCORI can’t do cost-
effectiveness?, http://theincidentaleconomist.com/wordpress/who-says-pcori-cant-do-cost-
effectiveness/ (Oct. 14, 2013) (arguing that PCORI is not actually prohibited from such 
research, while acknowledging widespread views inside and outside the Institute that it is). 
Medicare and Medicaid are prohibited from using any such threshold to make coverage 
determinations. ACA § 6301(e). 
73 See infra Part I.D. 
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determine that newer anticoagulant drugs have a higher risk of 
gastrointestinal bleeding among older patients.74 Despite the greater 
convenience of the newer—and more expensive—drugs, this risk may make 
these drugs less appropriate for those older patients.75 Overall, the 
competing incentives of different stakeholders provide counterweights that 
can provide a more balanced understanding than reliance on data from any 
one kind of innovator. 
 
3. Off-label use  
 
Payers can also contribute to understanding and supporting off-label use 
of drugs. Pre-approval clinical trials often focus on relatively narrow 
indications to simplify the showing of efficacy and safety necessary to get 
regulatory approval. But once a drug becomes available, doctors are free to 
prescribe it for other purposes that are not indicated in the FDA-approved 
label for the product. In some fields, such as oncology, off-label use of 
products for indications beyond the scope of FDA approval is quite 
common.76 Drug companies have relatively low incentives to conduct costly 
clinical trials to provide evidence for off-label use, especially once such use 
enters into widespread practice; firms might benefit from increased drug 
sales without having to incur the costs and risks of further trials. Many off-
label uses are, unsurprisingly, unsupported by rigorous evidence, even when 
they have become the standard of care.77 
FDA has long sought to motivate drug companies to conduct further 
clinical trials of off-label uses by preventing firms from promoting their 
products for off-label use. FDA takes the position that promotion of a 
product for off-label uses renders the product “misbranded” in violation of 
                                                 
74 Neena Abraham, et al., Comparative risk of gastrointestinal bleeding with 
dabigatran, rivaroxaban, and warfarin: population based cohort study, BRIT. MED. J. 350 
(2015). 
75 See Constantinos Michaelidis, Risk of GI Bleeding With Use of NOACs for Atrial 
Fibrillation: Commentary on Two Recent Cohort, American College of Cardiology : Latest 
in Cardiology (Jul. 14, 2015), http://www.acc.org/latest-in-cardiology/articles/2015/07/14/
12/14/risk-of-gi-bleeding-with-use-of-noacs-for-atrial-fibrillation. 
76 See, e.g., Dominique Levêque, Off-Label Use of Anticancer Drugs, 9 LANCET 
ONCOL. 1102 (2008); Rena M. Conti et al., Prevalence of Off-Label Use and Spending in 
2010 Among Patent-Protected Chemotherapies in a Population-Based Cohort of Medical 
Oncologists, 31 J. CLIN. ONCOL. 1134 (2013) (finding 30% off-label use of ten leading 
patent-protected intravenous chemotherapeutics, and over 50% off-label use for some). 
77 See Largent EA et al., Going off-Label without Venturing off-Course: Evidence and 
Ethical off-Label Prescribing, 169 ARCH. INTERN. MED. 1745 (2009) (describing different 
levels of evidence for off-label use). 
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the Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act.78 But recent judicial decisions have held 
that the First Amendment protects drug companies and their sales force 
from criminal prosecution for promoting off-label use.79 Moreover, once a 
generic version of the drug is available, the original sponsor has little 
incentive to invest in costly clinical trials of off-label uses for a product that 
is no longer profitable.80 
Payers have the incentive to ensure that off-label uses are effective and 
supported by evidence, because ineffective uses are wasted money.81 They 
also have the data to observe the effectiveness of off-label uses that have 
already entered into practice. Observational studies in payer health records 
may provide a more cost-effective alternative for filling the information gap 
about the effects of off-label uses of drugs. 
 
4. Prevention and long-term effects  
 
Pre-approval clinical trials are necessarily limited in duration, and thus 
have limited value in determining long-term health effects over an extended 
period of time. We noted above that clinical trials may fail to reveal toxic 
side effects that manifest over time.82 For some products, such as vaccines 
and other prophylactic measures to prevent disease or forestall its 
progression, long-term effects are critical for determining not just safety, 
but also efficacy.83 In recent decades FDA has adapted its regulatory 
approach to permit approval of some products on the basis of data on 
“surrogate markers” rather than requiring that trials continue for years to 
measure disease endpoints.84 This allows products to get to market that 
                                                 
78 21 U.S.C. § 352 
79 U.S. v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2012); Amarin Pharma v. FDA (No. 2015-cv-
03588, Docket No. 73, S.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 2015) (order granting preliminary relief 
preventing FDA misbranding action for off-label promotion involving truthful statements). 
80 See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Problem of New Uses, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & 
ETHICS 717 (2005). 
81 Cf. Monika K. Krzyzanowska, Off-Label Use of Cancer Drugs: A Benchmark Is 
Established, 31 J. CLIN. ONCOL. 1125, 1126 (2013) (“[I]n the short term, the greatest 
opportunity to optimize off-label prescribing is likely at the reimbursement level. . . . On 
the part of payers, there should be greater scrutiny of reimbursement for drugs that are 
potentially toxic and expensive and are associated with a high proportion of off-label 
prescribing.”). 
82 See supra Part I.C.1. 
83 See INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, EVALUATION OF BIOMARKERS AND SURROGATE 
ENDPOINTS IN CHRONIC DISEASE 38–45 (2010) [EVALUATION OF BIOMARKERS]. 
84 See, e.g., Russell Katz, Biomarkers and Surrogate Markers: An FDA Perspective, 1 
NEURORX 189 (2004); Thomas R. Fleming & John H. Powers, Biomarkers and Surrogate 
Endpoints in Clinical Trials, 31 STAT. MED. 2973 (2012). 
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might otherwise not be approvable under a more rigorous application of 
standards for safety and efficacy. But although it might not be commercially 
feasible to require that clinical trials continue for many years, the lack of 
data on clinical endpoints is a significant gap in the information base for 
determining appropriate clinical use of these products, especially since 
many surrogate endpoints are eventually found to be poor predictors of 
clinical outcomes.85 
Payer data on clinical outcomes can provide a valuable and cost-
effective supplement to the limited data available from clinical trials in 
these circumstances. A recent example that illustrates the potential for payer 
clinical data to show the long-term value of prophylactic treatment is a 
study of the pre-exposure prophylactic use (known as PrEP) of anti-
retroviral drugs using data from Kaiser-Permanente in San Francisco.86 In 
that study, not a single person using PrEP was infected with HIV.87 This 
study is notable because payer data confirmed that a potentially costly 
treatment is valuable, rather than indicating that a costly product should be 
used more sparingly.88 When payers may be on the hook for more costly 
future medical care, they may benefit financially from more extensive use 
of prophylactic treatment that forestalls the need for that future care.89 
 
5. Personalized medicine 
 
Personalized medicine, also known as precision medicine and frequently 
touted as the future of medicine,90 takes the idea of comparative 
                                                 
85 See T. R. Fleming & D. L. DeMets, Surrogate End Points in Clinical Trials: Are We 
Being Misled?, 125 ANN. INTERN. MED. 605 (1996); INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, EVALUATION 
OF BIOMARKERS, supra note 83, at 45–52. 
86 Jonathan E. Volk et al., No New HIV Infections With Increasing Use of HIV 
Preexposure Prophylaxis in a Clinical Practice Setting, 61 CLIN. INFECT. DIS. 1601 (2015); 
Carlos F Cáceres et al., The Promises and Challenges of Pre-Exposure Prophylaxis as Part 
of the Emerging Paradigm of Combination HIV Prevention, 18 J. INT. AIDS SOC. (2015). 
87 Volk et al., supra note 86. 
88 Id.  The wholesale acquisition cost of Truvada for PrEP is around $1,300 per month. 
David Heitz, Insurers and Medicaid Cover It. So What’s Behind the Slow Adoption of 
Truvada PrEP?, HEALTHLINE  (May 8, 2014), http://www.healthline.com/health-news/hiv-
prevention-truvada-prep-covered-by-most-insurers-050814 (last visited February 11, 
2016).  
89 See James F. Fries et al., Reducing Health Care Costs by Reducing the Need and 
Demand for Medical Services, 329 N. ENGL. J. MED. 321 (1993) (making the case for cost-
savings through preventive care); but see Joshua T. Cohen et al., Does Preventive Care 
Save Money? Health Economics and the Presidential Candidates, 358 N. ENGL. J. MED. 
661 (2008) (noting that some preventive measures save money while others are costly). 
90 See Barbara J. Evans, What Will It Take to Reap the Clinical Benefits of 
Pharmacogenomics, 61 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 753 (2006); Geoffrey S. Ginsburg & Jeanette J. 
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effectiveness research to the individual or small-group level. Personalized 
medicine focuses on providing “the right patient with the right drug at the 
right dose at the right time.”91 It responds to the inherent variation among 
patients, or among groups, by linking that biological variation to differences 
in the most effective and efficient treatment.92 An early success story for 
personalized medicine is the use of a test to identify those patients that 
could benefit from the breast-cancer drug Herceptin, a drug that is effective 
only against tumors that overexpress a particular gene named HER2/neu.93 
A simple genetic test can measure whether a patient’s tumor overexpresses 
the gene, allowing providers to give the drug only to patients with tumors 
that are likely to respond to it, while sparing other patients from exposure to 
unnecessary side effects.94 Personalized medicine may also answer other 
kinds of questions, such as the appropriate dose of a drug based on patient 
sex, weight, and genetic makeup95 or which patients might benefit more or 
less from the availability of an inpatient hospital bed.96 Research is 
underway to explore more complex and sophisticated personalized 
medicine implementations.97 
A key piece of this research is the use and understanding of genomic 
data and biomarkers.98 An individual’s genome—the sum of his or her 
                                                                                                                            
McCarthy, Personalized Medicine: Revolutionizing Drug Discovery and Patient Care, 19 
TRENDS BIOTECHNOL. 491 (2001); Rachel Sachs, Innovation Law and Policy: Preserving 
the Future of Personalized Medicine, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. __, (forthcoming 2016), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2596875. 
91 Food & Drug Admin., Personalized Medicine, http://www.fda.gov/scienceresearch/
specialtopics/personalizedmedicine/default.htm (Jan. 30, 2015). 
92 Id. 
93 Isaac S. Chan & Geoffrey S. Ginsburg, Personalized Medicine: Progress and 
Promise, 12 ANNU. REV. GENOMICS HUM. GENET. 217 (2011). 
94 Id. 
95 For example, consider the voluminous literature on dosing considerations for the 
blood thinner warfarin based not only on physical patient characteristics but also on which 
versions of drug-metabolizing enzymes the patient’s genes encode. See, e.g., J.L. Anderson 
et al., Randomized trial of genotype-guided versus standard warfarin dosing in patients 
initiating oral anticoagulation. 116 CIRCULATION 2563, 2563–70 (2007); Y. Caraco, S. 
Blotnick, & M. Muszkat, CYP2C9 Genotype-Guided Warfarin Prescribing Enhances the 
Efficacy and Safety of Anticoagulation: A Prospective Randomized Controlled Study. 2008 
CLIN. PHARMACOL. THER. 460, 460–70; www.warfarindosing.org. 
96 I. Glenn Cohen et al., The Legal And Ethical Concerns That Arise From Using 
Complex Predictive Analytics In Health Care, 33 HEALTH AFF. 1139 (2014). 
97 See, e.g., W. Nicholson Price II, Black-Box Medicine, 28 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 419 
(2015) (discussing complex and opaque medical algorithms). 
98 A biomarker is a measurable characteristic that indicates a biological state within the 
body. Kyle Strimbu & Jorge A. Tavel, What Are Biomarkers?, 5 CURR. OPIN. HIV AIDS 
463 (2010). 
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genetic information—represents a tremendous amount of biological 
variability, including how fast the individual may metabolize certain drugs99 
and how likely the individual is to develop a certain type of cancer.100 Aside 
from a patient’s own genetic information, the genetics of viruses, bacteria, 
and cancerous tumors can inform the treatment of related diseases.101 Other 
biomarkers, like blood-sugar level, the amount of prostate-specific antigen, 
or the previously mentioned overexpression of HER2 by a tumor, can 
similarly be used to direct treatment (for diabetes, prostate cancer, and 
breast cancer, respectively). 
Payers have an opportunity to use their data to contribute to 
personalized medicine research. They have demographic and health 
information about patients, including information about treatments and 
outcomes. Optum, for example, is involved in developing predictive 
analytics technology to identify high-risk patients based on a combination 
of administrative claims data and real-time clinical data from multiple 
sources.102 These data may reveal patterns of which drugs or treatments 
work best for which patients, and which patients might be best off avoiding 
treatment altogether in particular circumstances. Payers may have direct 
access to tissue samples (or analyses of those samples) to determine 
biomarker, genetic, and genomic status; if they do not, they may be well 
positioned to collaborate with other researchers to link health records to 
tissue samples.103 In fact, payers are important participants in the eMERGE 
network, further discussed below.104  
The incentives of payers to perform personalized medicine research may 
offer a useful counterweight to the incentives of the drug companies that 
have become the key drivers of personalized medicine.105 For drug 
                                                 
99 See Chan & Ginsburg, supra note 93, at 227 (2011) (describing the use of genetic 
analysis of two genes, CYP2C9 and VKORC1, to predict metabolization rate of the blood 
thinner warfarin and prospectively adjust dosage accordingly). 
100 See Y Miki et al., A Strong Candidate for the Breast and Ovarian Cancer 
Susceptibility Gene BRCA1, 266 SCIENCE 66 (1994) (identifying the BRCA1 gene, linked 
to breast and ovarian cancer); Myriad, BRACANALYSIS, https://www.myriad.com/products-
services/hereditary-cancers/bracanalysis/ (describing commercially available test for breast 
and ovarian cancer susceptibility based on genetic analysis of the BRCA1 and BRCA2 
genes). 
101 Chan & Ginsburg, supra note 93. 
102 Optum, Improved Predictive Analytics Better Identify High-Risk Patients, HEALTH 
CARE CONVERSAT., http://healthcare-conversation.com/2015/06/08/improved-predictive-
analytics-better-identify-high-risk-patients/ (June 8, 2015). 
103 The eMERGE network, discussed infra in Part II.B.3, aims to facilitate this linking 
practice. 
104 See Part II.B.3. infra. 
105 See Chan & Ginsburg, supra note 93 (describing pharmaceutical company 
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companies, personalized medicine presents a tradeoff between more reliable 
treatment and smaller market size. If research shows that a particular drug 
only works for a third of people taking it, and provides a mechanism for 
identifying those patients, the other two thirds will no longer use the 
product, and sales will decline.106 If the company can market a new, 
targeted drug, and potentially a companion diagnostic, it may be able to 
charge a higher price for a drug that is more likely to be effective in its 
targeted group. For payers, on the other hand, broader implementation of 
personalized medicine could improve healthcare quality and reduce costs. A 
payer, for example, might save costs by demonstrating that two-thirds of 
patients currently taking an expensive drug would be better off taking an 
older generic drug or other less expensive treatment—or no treatment at 
all.107 Of course, both drug companies and payers face the risk that 
observational studies will not yield the results that are best for their bottom 
lines. But financial incentives are nonetheless likely to inform the research 
questions that they pursue, and perhaps to influence their analysis of results 
and their decisions about what results merit publication. The participation of 
both drug companies and payers as innovators in the field of personalized 
medicine is thus likely to yield a more balanced and complete picture than 
would emerge if the field were dominated by the drug companies. 
 
D.  Incentives for innovation 
 
Although payers are in a good position to play a larger role in healthcare 
innovation, their incentives to invest in innovation are constrained by a 
number of economic and regulatory features of the healthcare market. First, 
some quirks of health-care markets and tax law directly reduce incentives. 
Second, because payers typically do not directly control care, they may fail 
to realize the full cost saving benefits from their innovation. Third, 
                                                                                                                            
development of companion diagnostics for drugs). This is not to argue that insurer 
incentives are perfect, as discussed below. Patients and payers may have different views as 
to acceptable money-for-health tradeoffs. Moreover, patients can shift between payers over 
time, giving current payers an incentive to postpone costly treatment to shift the cost to 
another payer; this happens most clearly as patients age into Medicare and leave private 
payers. 
106 Firms may have ways to recoup that loss. For example, it may be possible to patent 
a diagnostic device to guide the choice of treatment, allowing the firm to charge higher 
prices for personalized medicine. In some cases the identification of a subgroup that 
benefits from a drug may lead to approval of a drug that would otherwise present an 
unacceptable balance of safety and efficacy in an undifferentiated patient population.  
107 The opposite could, of course, also be true; a diagnostic test might reveal that an 
older, cheaper drug is unsuitable for a subsection of the patient population, who might then 
need to take a more expensive newer drug. 
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intellectual property incentives are less available for the innovation 
opportunities available to payers than they are for otherkinds of innovation 
such as new products. 
 
1. Market quirks and tax preferences  
 
Cost sensitivity should motivate payers to invest in developing or 
identifying more cost-effective treatments. However, the U.S. market for 
health care and insurance has complexities and idiosyncracies that blur 
these incentives.108 Four features particularly dampen the cost-sensitivity of 
payers: muted competition, passed-on costs, tax subsidies, and medical loss 
ratios.  
First, payers frequently face muted competition due to industry 
consolidation, status-quo bias, and product opacity. The industry is highly 
consolidated, which gives payers some power to dictate the terms of their 
coverage and the rates they charge.109 Status quo bias further weakens 
competition, because employers and individuals have a tendency to stick 
with the payer they currently use.110 Finally, product opacity may also 
reduce competition among insurance products.111 While these factors 
                                                 
108 The U.S. health-care market is the subject of a vast scholarly literature that we do 
not try to summarize or augment here. Instead, we merely highlight a few features of the 
market that may decrease incentives for payers to innovate. 
109 LEEMORE DAFNY ET AL., PAYING A PREMIUM ON YOUR PREMIUM? CONSOLIDATION 
IN THE U.S. HEALTH INSURANCE INDUSTRY 3 (National Bureau of Economic Research, 
Working Paper 15434, October 2009), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w15434; 
MARIKA CABRAL ET AL., DOES PRIVATIZED HEALTH INSURANCE BENEFIT PATIENTS OR 
PRODUCERS? EVIDENCE FROM MEDICARE ADVANTAGE (National Bureau of Economic 
Research, Working Paper 20470, September 2014), available at http://www.nber.org/
papers/w20470 (finding that concentrated payer markets led to a marked decrease in how 
much Medicare Advantage premium supports (public funds provided to lower premiums) 
actually decreased premiums paid by patients). 
110 Benjamin R. Handel, Adverse Selection and Inertia in Health Insurance Markets: 
When Nudging Hurts, 103 AM. ECON. REV. 2643 (2013) (documenting plan inertia at a 
large firm). 
111 Although the Affordable Care Act has drastically increased the transparency of 
insurance plans, exactly what services and products are covered by a plan remain 
challenging to discern and compare, especially for individual purchasers. See, e.g., JEFFREY 
R. KLING ET AL., COMPARISON FRICTION: EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE FROM MEDICARE 
DRUG PLANS (National Bureau of Economic Research, 2011), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w17410 (finding low information access in choosing Medicare 
Part D plans); cf, SAURABH BHARGAVA ET AL., DO INDIVIDUALS MAKE SENSIBLE HEALTH 
INSURANCE DECISIONS? EVIDENCE FROM A MENU WITH DOMINATED OPTIONS 4 (National 
Bureau of Economic Research, 2015), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w21160 
(describing substantial numbers of employees choosing strictly inferior health plans and 
attributing this choice to inability to understand plan options).  
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interact in complex ways far beyond the scope of this Article, they may 
combine to decrease competitive pressure on payers to innovate to lower 
costs.112  
Second, the combination of weak market competition and weak 
oversight of price increases by insurance regulators allow payers to pass on 
increased costs to their customers with relative ease through increased 
premiums,113 although the Affordable Care Act has introduced some limits 
on the ability of payers to raise premiums in a deliberate attempt to increase 
cost sensitivity.114 
Third, tax subsidies for health insurance have dampened incentives for 
frugality on the demand side of healthcare. Health insurance premiums paid 
by an employer are both fully deductible by the employer as a business 
expense and also excluded from the employee’s taxable income.115 In this 
system the government shares the costs of healthcare, diminishing the 
interest of patients and their employers in cost-lowering innovation and 
making it easier for insurers to pass rising costs along to them in the form of 
higher premiums.  
Fourth and finally, the complex dynamics of the Affordable Care Act’s 
medical loss ratio (MLR) provisions may reduce incentives for cost-
lowering innovation. Under those provisions, payers must pay 85 cents in 
                                                 
112 The exact mechanics of decreased competition, and its precise effects on innovation 
incentives, are complex and beyond the scope of this Article or, indeed, our expertise. For 
instance, decreased competition may decrease the need for intellectual property protection, 
if competitors are not seeking to appropriate innovations for themselves. Opacity could 
potentially cut in both directions; it may decrease competition, but may also allow payers 
to shield potentially controversial cost-cutting innovations from public scrutiny. Teasing 
out the full effects of these market features requires substantial further study. 
113 See NAIC Health Insurance and Managed Care (B) Committee, Rate Review White 
Paper (June 27, 2012), http://www.naic.org/documents/committees_b_related_wp_rate_
review.pdf.  
114 See, e.g., Internal Revenue Service, Notice 2015-16: Section 4980I — Excise Tax 
on High Cost Employer-Sponsored Health Coverage (2015), available at 
www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/n-15-16.pdf (instituting the so-called “Cadillac Tax” of 40% on 
plans with very high premiums). . 
115 The staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation estimated value of this tax 
expenditure in 2014 at $143 billion. See ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR 
FISCAL YEARS 2014-2018, prepared for the House Committee on Ways and Means and the 
Senate Committee on Finance by the Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation (Aug. 5, 
2014), at 31 (Table I), https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=4663. 
The Congressional Budget Office arrived at a higher estimate of $250 billion that includes 
the cost to the government of tax preferences for employee contributions to health 
insurance premiums. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, OPTIONS FOR REDUCING THE 
DEFICIT: 2014-2023 (Nov. 2013) at 243-249, https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/
cbofiles/attachments/44715-OptionsForReducingDeficit-3.pdf.  
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medical expenses for each dollar received in premiums.116 This sets a 
ceiling on the increase in profits to be gained by lowering costs; it can be no 
higher than 15% minus administrative expenses. While countervailing 
factors exist in the MLR regime—increased efficiency may offset other 
rising costs, and quality improvement research counts as part of the 
“medical expense” 85%—on the margin, this cap may reduce profit-based 
incentives for innovation. Overall, these features of the health market likely 
combine to lower incentives to innovate toward efficiency. The marginal 
incentive for frugal innovation diminishes to the extent that payers are able 
to pass on cost increases to employers and patients. 
 
2. Challenges implementing innovation 
 
Payer incentives to innovate are further mediated by the reality that 
many payers do not actually provide care. For payers to benefit from their 
innovations around quality, efficiency, and medical targeting, health care 
providers must actually adopt those innovations. Payers must therefore 
influence providers to implement changes. In a fee-for-service system, 
health care providers face perverse incentives to use more and costlier 
treatments, thereby increasing their own remuneration. Thus, at least some 
provider incentives are in serious tension with the goals of frugal payer 
innovation.117 Integrated health systems, which both provide and pay for 
care, may find it easier to control the behavior of providers. 
Traditional payers’ options for influencing caregiver behavior range 
from direct procedure-setting to collaborative knowledge-sharing. Payers 
can use utilization review and reimbursement tiering to guide physician 
behavior, though these practices have had a contentious history.118 Payers 
                                                 
116 Small payers (fewer than 100 subscribers) must meet a MLR threshold of 80%. 
ACA § 1001. For a summary of this requirement, see Suzanne M. Kirchhoff, Medical Loss 
Ratio Requirements Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA): Issues 
for Congress (2014), available at https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42735.pdf.  
117 This problem is not unique to health insurers, and indeed may be seen as just 
another manifestation of principal-agent conflicts. Nonetheless, we mention it here because 
it potentially decreases the incentive for insurers to innovate and because it may increase 
their incentive to collaborate with providers. 
118 The principal mechanism of relatively direct payer control over physician decisions 
has long been utilization review, where insurers—and especially managed care 
organizations—review decisions for medical appropriateness to decide whether to pay for 
the care; review could be prospective or retrospective. Substantial scholarship has focused 
on the impact of utilization review. Among many others, see, e.g., Paul J. Feldstein et al., 
Private Cost Containment. The Effects of Utilization Review Programs on Health Care Use 
and Expenditures., 318 N. ENGL. J. MED. 1310 (1988); Thomas M. Wickizer, The Effect of 
Utilization Review on Hospital Use and Expenditures: A Review of the Literature and an 
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can also influence provider behavior less directly by, for example, 
publishing their results and working to establish best practices, which can 
include clinical guidelines or “critical pathways,” reflecting treatment 
patterns that are both effective and efficient.119 Treatment pathways are 
most frequently developed by expert committees—typically well-known 
physicians—relying on published literature.120 Payers may influence these 
committees by contributing their studies to the published literature. Payers 
may be more effective in influencing clinical practice when they collaborate 
with influential clinicians to conduct and publish observational studies, 
before providing them to expert communities that can then establish 
standards of care. Such collaborations are a feature of the PCORnet and 
eMERGE networks. But to the extent that providers resist following new 
clinical guidelines, the benefit of the innovation is diminished.121 
Payers can also try to align provider incentives with cost-saving goals 
by using financial incentives or risk-sharing. If providers are compensated 
on a fee-for-service basis, increased treatment costs mean increased 
provider compensation, making it difficult to motivate providers to pursue 
efficiency. This is the subject of a large literature; we note here only that to 
the extent that incentives are successfully aligned, providers have greater 
incentives to adopt payer innovations, especially frugal innovation. This 
should increase the benefit to payers of developing such innovations, and 
thus the likelihood that they will make the necessary investments.  
This may be why integrated providers such as Kaiser Permanente have 
been more active participants in payer innovation than traditional insurers. 
It may be easier to implement cost-saving innovations through caregivers 
                                                                                                                            
Update on Recent Findings, 47 MED. CARE RES. REV. 327 (1990). However, managed care 
and utilization review prompted significant backlash around the turn of the millennium. 
See, e.g., Marc A. Rodwin, Backlash as Prelude to Managing Managed Care, 24 J. 
HEALTH POLIT. POL’Y LAW 1115 (1999); David Mechanic, The Managed Care Backlash: 
Perceptions and Rhetoric in Health Care Policy and the Potential for Health Care Reform, 
79 MILBANK Q. 35 (2001). 
119 See, e.g., Nathan R. Every et al., Critical Pathways: A Review, 101 CIRCULATION 
461 (2000). 
120 See, e.g., P4 Pathways, Protocol Development, https://www.p4pathways.com/go/
p4pathways/program/services/pathway-development.htm (describing a protocol-
development steering committee comprising “locally based academic and community 
oncologists to ensure pathways reflect both rigorous evidence-based medicine and the 
clinical expertise in that region”). 
121 See, e.g., Rainer Blaser et al., Improving Pathway Compliance and Clinician 
Performance by Using Information Technology, 76 INT. J. MED. INF. 151 (2007). For an 
example of a compliance-monitoring schema, see P4 Pathways, Compliance Monitoring, 
https://www.p4pathways.com/go/p4pathways/program/services/compliance-
monitoring.htm. 
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who are salaried employees with nothing to gain from the provision of 
costly and excessive care. The Affordable Care Act aims to achieve similar 
alignment of incentives for frugality through Accountable Care 
Organizations, coordinated groups of physicians, hospitals, and other 
providers.122 Among other benefits, these structures allow physicians to 
share in the financial benefits of frugal care, shifting their incentives from 
those of traditional fee-for-service.123 More broadly, the Affordable Care 
Act aims to shift a substantial fraction of care aware from fee-for-service 
towards value-based payments or other frugality-focused payment models, 
which should further align the incentives of payers and providers and enable 
smoother adoption of demand-side innovation.124 
Finally, payers could influence the behavior of providers by using data 
to influence FDA regulatory decisions. They might, for example, use their 
data to reveal risks to FDA that it should study through the Sentinel System, 
perhaps leading to future warnings or even withdrawal of product 
approvals. These regulatory moves might have a greater impact on the 
behavior of caregivers than the exhortations of payers. 
 
3. Intellectual property incentives 
 
Intellectual property raises a final set of questions about payer 
incentives. Standard intellectual property incentives for innovation are 
typically geared toward the producers of new products, although high prices 
for patent-protected products may have the incidental benefit of motivating 
payers to invest in learning how to use these products more sparingly. More 
fundamentally, the excludability at the center of intellectual property is not 
a viable option for the type of payer innovations discussed above.125 But 
other incentives and subsidies for payer innovation are available and in use 
to promote payer innovation.  
In a familiar story, intellectual property provides legal excludability to 
                                                 
122 See Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Accountable Care Organizations, 
http://cms.gov/aco (Jan. 6, 2015). 
123 Id. 
124 See Sylvia M. Burwell, Setting Value-Based Payment Goals — HHS Efforts to 
Improve U.S. Health Care, 372 N. ENGL. J. MED. 897 (2015) (setting goal of 30% of 
traditional fee-for-service payments to alternative payment models by the end of 2016, and 
50% by the end of 2018). 
125 See Amy Kapczynski & Talha Syed, The Continuum of Excludability and the Limits 
of Patents, 112 YALE L.J. 1923–41 (2013) (describing how patents are ineffective at 
protecting inventions that are hard to exclude others from using, and describing the specific 
examples of negative information about drugs, positive information about health-enhancing 
lifestyle interventions, and health-care quality initiatives). 
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solve the public goods problem that would otherwise prevent innovators 
from capturing the full value of their investments. By allowing innovators 
to exclude competitors from using their information goods, intellectual 
property permits them to raise prices, thereby increasing ex ante incentives 
to innovate. The forms of payer innovation considered above are pure 
information goods; there is typically no new physical product that the payer 
can sell associated with the knowledge gained from observational studies of 
patient health records, for example.126 But intellectual property is a poor fit 
for appropriating and monetizing the value of this knowledge; secrecy is 
ineffective and inappropriate, and patents are largely unavailable.127 
The first and most obvious way to appropriate an information good is to 
keep it secret; if others do not have the information, they cannot use it. This 
strategy is ill suited to payer medical information, because payers must at a 
minimum share the information with doctors and other caregivers before 
they can put it to use in a clinical setting. Moreover, caregivers are required 
to obtain informed consent for medical treatment, which may require further 
disclosure of the information to patients. Broader disclosure may be 
necessary to bring about a change in the standard of care. For example, if 
payer studies indicate that caregivers should not continue to provide a form 
of treatment that is considered the standard of care in the medical 
community, caregivers may fear potential malpractice liability for 
withholding the treatment.128 Widespread disclosure of the study results 
may therefore be necessary to facilitate clinical implementation of changes 
in the standard of care. Secrecy may thus be a serious obstacle to effective 
use of payer innovations. 
Patents on comparative effectiveness research results or personalized 
                                                 
126 The patent on the relevant drug—and the higher prices it enables—provide a 
different incentive, discussed below at note 133 and accompanying text. 
127 The third major form of exclusivity in the medical world is FDA-mediated 
regulatory exclusivity, whereby FDA refuses to approve competitor products, or to allow 
competitors to use the innovator’s regulatory data submissions, for a certain period of time 
to give the first-to-be-approved product a period of lucrative exclusivity. Rebecca S. 
Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. 
REV. 345 (2007). This form of exclusivity is inapplicable here. 
128 Under medical malpractice law, doctors and other medical professionals may be 
liable for negligently injuring patients; demonstrating that the care provided was within the 
relevant standard of care serves as a defense against malpractice liability. John C. Drapp 
III, The National Standard of Care in Medical Malpractice Actions: Does Small Area 
Analysis Make It Another Legal Fiction, 6 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 95, 96–100 (2002). 
Accordingly, doctors have an incentive to follow the current standard of care to avoid 
liability. If payers aim to guide physician behavior into providing better forms of care—
whether more cost effective or more personally effective—demonstrating that the preferred 
care is a new or developing standard is an important part of that process.  
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medicine information are likely unavailable, unenforceable, and impractical. 
Judicial limitations on what sorts of inventions constitute patentable subject 
matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101 cast considerable doubt on the patent 
eligibility of algorithms for selecting medical treatments for patients.129 
Standard patent law rules about prior art are also likely to prevent the 
patenting of the treatment options themselves. Because observational 
studies of health outcomes necessarily involve treatments that are already a 
part of current practice, those treatments could not be patented because they 
are already in public use and on sale.130 Even if these innovations were 
patentable, the patents might be difficult to enforce for at least three 
reasons: first, it would be difficult to observe and police infringing behavior 
in light of the privacy of health records;131 second, medical practitioners 
practicing medical activities have a statutory exemption from patent 
infringement remedies;132 and third, suing doctors to prevent them from 
practicing medicine more effectively might create a public relations 
problem for a healthcare payer  
Although intellectual property does not provide the same direct 
incentives for medical innovation by payers that it provides for product 
sellers, it may provide an important indirect motivation for payers by 
increasing the costs they incur in covering patented products. When Kaiser 
Permanente collaborated with FDA to study the cardiac side effects of 
Vioxx, payers were collectively paying $2.5 billion per year for Vioxx, 
creating a conspicuous opportunity to cut costs by reducing the use of 
                                                 
129 See Mayo Collaborative v. Prometheus Labs., 566 U.S. 10 (2012) (holding a 
diagnostic method patent involving customizing patient dosages unpatentable subject 
matter as preempting a law of nature); Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S.Ct. 2347 
(2014) (holding unpatentable a financial method patent and clarifying that abstract 
inventions like algorithms are not made patentable by implementing them on a general-
purpose computer); see also Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Prometheus Rebound: Diagnostics, 
Nature, and Mathematical Algorithms, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 341 (2013) (analyzing 
Prometheus in the context of medical algorithms); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Diagnostics Need 
Not Apply, 21 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 256 (2015). 
130 Sections 102 and 103 require that inventions be new and nonobvious, respectively, 
to be patentable. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103. If particular treatments are in use and are known to 
be medically useful, innovation in comparative effectiveness research demonstrating their 
relative efficacy may be difficult to bring past the §§ 102/103 bars. 
131 See Kapczynski & Syed, supra note 125, at 1938–40 (describing the difficulty in 
enforcing health-care quality patents). Broader availability of health data, such as access to 
EHRs, could ease enforcement concerns, though HIPAA limitations may restrict such 
access. Even with more available data, enforcement still faces challenges. See id. 
132 Under 35 U.S.C. § 287(c), medical practitioners and related health care entities are 
not liable for infringement for performing any “medical or surgical procedure on a body,” 
not including the use of patented drugs or biotechnological processes.  
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Vioxx.133 Payers may be less interested in studying the effects of less costly 
treatments that are already off patent, except in comparative effectiveness 
studies that offer the prospect of lowering costs incurred for coverage of a 
higher-priced alternative. In this indirect sense, the law of intellectual 
property is likely to structure the incentives of payers towards more scrutiny 
of the clinical benefits of patented treatments.  
Despite these gaps in incentives, some payers are already making 
notable efforts to advance the use of payer data for medical innovation. We 
posit that at least three reasons why some level of innovation even without 
traditional intellectual property incentives. First, as we noted above, for 
innovation related to costly patent-protected treatment, high costs create an 
incentive to reduce costs. Second, observational studies are relatively cheap, 
especially as compared to expensive clinical trials. Third, there are a variety 
of government initiatives under way that are partnering with payers and 
helping them to overcome obstacles and kickstart their own research. In the 
next Parts we discuss challenges in this research and explore how 
government policies help payers overcome those challenges.  
 
II. TECHNICAL CHALLENGES 
 
The use of payer data for innovation presents substantial technical 
challenges.134 Some challenges involving the storage and analysis of data 
are not unique to healthcare and therefore benefit from overall 
improvements in information technology.135 Special concerns in the 
healthcare field revolve around data availability, data quality, data 
assembly, and data interoperability. The federal government has provided a 
substantial assist to payer innovation through legislation and agency 
initiatives targeting these challenges. 
                                                 
133 Barbara Martinez et al., Merck Pulls Vioxx Off Market After Link to Heart 
Problems, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 1, 2004), available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB109654671320932405. 
134 For an overview, see Niels Peek et al., Technical Challenges for Big Data in 
Biomedicine and Health: Data Sources, Infrastructure, and Analytics, 9 YEARB. MED. 
INFORM. 42 (2014). 
135 For instance, natural language processing of electronic health records—determining 
what doctors mean when they write narratives—is a very challenging task, but natural 
language processing in health records builds off of extensive natural language processing 
efforts in other fields. See, e.g., Prakash M. Nadkarni et al., Natural Language Processing: 
An Introduction, 18 J. AM. MED. INFORM. ASSOC. 544 (2011) (describing natural language 
processing and how generalist efforts might be applicable to health informatics issues); 
Lucila Ohno-Machado, Realizing the Full Potential of Electronic Health Records: The 
Role of Natural Language Processing, 18 J. AM. MED. INFORM. ASSOC. 539 (2011) 
(introducing a special issue on the topic).  
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A.  Making data useful for research 
 
First, data must be acquired and assembled. As discussed above, payers 
have direct access to some data, principally administrative claims data and 
prescription data, and may have indirect access to hospital 
admissions/releases, laboratory testing data, and provider records of clinical 
care.136 It takes time, money, and technical expertise to bring these data 
together, link them by patient and demographic information, and structure 
the data to permit meaningful analyses.137 Even when firms have access to 
data from different sources, the fragmented nature of the health-care system 
means that those different sources will cover different populations of 
patients. For example, although Optum’s Data Warehouse has health data 
for over 150 million unique patients, it has the combination of claims, 
prescription, and clinical records for fewer than three percent of those 
patients.138 
For some studies, it is necessary to assemble comprehensive data not 
only across different patients in a population, but also across different 
periods in the lives of particular patients.139 Longitudinal data—that is, data 
that follow patients over long periods of time—are useful for measuring 
preventive treatments, long-term drug effects, interactions between 
treatments, and other important medical questions.140 But the records of any 
one payer frequently only cover a relatively limited span of a patient’s life. 
                                                 
136 See supra Part I.A. Some particularly notable efforts include Optum Labs’ Data 
Warehouse and IBM’s Watson Health, which recently acquired Truven Analytics and has 
at least some form of data for approximately 300 million patients. See Optum, Data, 
https://www.optum.com/life-sciences/data.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2016) (describing 
Optum’s Data Warehouse); IBM, Press Release: IBM Watson Health Announces Plans to 
Acquire Truven Health Analytics for $2.6B, Extending Its Leadership in Value-Based Care 
Solutions, http://www-03.ibm.com/press/us/en/pressrelease/49132.wss (Feb. 18, 2016). 
137 See, e.g., Barbara J. Evans, Sustainable Access to Data for Postmarketing Medical 
Product Safety Surveillance under the Amended HIPAA Privacy Rule, 24 HEALTH MATRIX 
11, 14 (2014). 
138 Optum, Optum Research Data Assets, 2 (2015), https://www.optum.com/life-
sciences/data.html (click link for “U.S. core data assets at the bottom of the page) (last 
visited Feb. 23, 2016) (listing cumulative population counts through 2014). 
139 See, e.g., Optum, Better Predictive Modeling Requires Bigger, More Varied, 
Higher Quality Data Sets, HEALTH CARE CONVERSATATION, http://healthcare-
conversation.com/2015/06/22/better-predictive-modeling-requires-bigger-more-varied-
higher-quality-data-sets/ (June 22, 2015) (describing the advantage of larger and more 
varied datasets in developing health predictive analytics). 
140 Weber GM et al., Finding the Missing Link for Big Biomedical Data, 311 J. AM. 
MED. ASSOC. 2479 (2014) (discussing the need to integrate patient records from different 
data sources). 
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Patients frequently switch their insurance coverage, whether because they 
change to a new job with a different set of payer options141 change payers 
while staying at the same job (perhaps because the employer changes its 
associated payers), change plans on the individual market, or become 
eligible or ineligible for Medicaid based on changing income. The largest 
change comes when patients turn 65 and become eligible for Medicare. In 
any of these situations, one payer stops collecting data about that patient, 
and another begins. Some patients, of course, stay with the same payer for 
decades; in that case the records of a single payer may provide long-term 
information without the need for aggregation. But this is rare; in one large 
dataset, only about 15% of patients had administrative claims data for more 
than five years.142 For most patients, assembling a longer-term record of 
information may be necessary to provide useful data for long-term studies. 
Some regional efforts are already trying to overcome the challenge of 
fragmented data to allow caregivers to exchange patient information more 
readily. One promising example, Cal INDEX, a nonprofit health 
information exchange,143 was founded in California in 2014 with seed 
money from two major payers, aiming to store centralized, comprehensive 
patient information for the vast majority of patients in California.144 
Providers choose whether to join the exchange,145 and their patients 
                                                 
141 Approximately 48% of Americans receive health insurance through their 
employers. Kaiser Family Foundation, Health Insurance Coverage of the Total Population, 
http://kff.org/other/state-indicator/total-population/ (2013 data; last visited July 16, 2015).. 
142 Optum, Optum Research Data Assets, supra note 138, at 3 (noting 63.1 million 
patients with affiliated administrative claims data for at least 1 day, but only 9.7 million 
with data for at least 60 months).  
143 Health Information Exchanges are key players in the field of interoperability and 
data exchange, helping enable information transfers between providers and payers. 
Exchanges still face substantial challenges in implementation more than a decade after their 
promotion, Robert S. Rudin et al., Usage and Effect of Health Information ExchangeA 
Systematic ReviewUsage and Effect of Health Information Exchange, 161 ANN. INTERN. 
MED. 803 (2014), but show benefits in the provision of care and for the eventual 
interoperability of health data, Jan Walker et al., The Value of Health Care Information 
Exchange and Interoperability, 24 HEALTH AFF. W5 (2005). 
144 See Cal INDEX, New California Not-for-Profit to Operate Statewide, Next-
Generation Health Information Exchange (August 5, 2014), 
https://www.calindex.org/new-california-healthcare-exchange/ (last accessed July 16, 
2015) (“Cal INDEX will securely collect and integrate clinical data from providers and 
claims data from payers to create comprehensive, retrievable patient-centered records 
known as longitudinal patient records (LPRs)”). 
145 See Cal INDEX, Provider FAQ, https://www.calindex.org/provider-faq/. Providers 
must pay fees to participate in Cal INDEX. For the first three years, patients covered by the 
two funding sponsors (Blue Shield of California and Anthem Blue Cross) will be included 
in Cal INDEX free of charge, and patients covered by other providers must pay 
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participate unless they opt out.146 If Cal INDEX can successfully persuade 
many providers in different payer networks to participate, it may succeed in 
resolving the problem of cross-provider data fragmentation, at least within 
California.147 A patient’s single longitudinal patient record will include both 
clinical and administrative claims data from multiple sources even as the 
patient shifts providers and payers.148 Cal INDEX’s stated purposes are to 
improve care and to increase efficiency, but it recognizes its consolidated 
dataset could also be a useful resource for research.149 
Second, and related, data from different sources must be interoperable—
that is, they must be in compatible formats so they can be joined and 
analyzed together.150 There is no standard format for electronic health 
records or administrative claims data, and data from different systems are 
typically kept in different formats.151 Moreover, some payers have changed 
from one data system to another over time. This means that any effort to 
aggregate data must translate data from one proprietary format to 
                                                                                                                            
subscription fees; after the initial three-year period, all providers and insurers will pay 
subscription fees. Id. 
146 See Cal INDEX, Opt Out, https://optout.calindex.org/OptOut/optout.html. Note that 
federal law requires opting-in for particular types of sensitive information such as 
substance abuse records, mental health information, and the results of an HIV test. See 
infra notes 233–239 and accompanying text. Thus, some types of data may remain 
fragmented, even if data sources are integrated.  
147 As described above, health data laws, including those on privacy, can vary from 
state to state. See supra id.. Cal INDEX apparently does not currently have infrastructure to 
capture patient records from other states to account for patient movement. However, other 
parallel efforts exist in other jurisdictions. 
148 See Cal INDEX, Provider FAQ,  https://www.calindex.org/provider-faq/ 
(describing a Longitudinal Patient Record as “comprehensive, retrievable, patient-centered 
record that integrates payer and provider data over time, [initially including] payer 
information (e.g., demographics, medical and Rx information)[, later adding provider-
supplied] clinical information from electronic medical records . . . and facility admission, 
discharge and transfer . . . systems (as examples).” 
149 See Cal INDEX, Value of Cal INDEX, https://www.calindex.org/value-of-cal-
index/ (noting that Cal INDEX can “benefit public health by providing de-identified data 
that can be used for medical research.”) 
150 See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE NATIONAL COORDINATOR FOR HEALTH INFORMATION 
TECHNOLOGY, CONNECTING HEALTH AND CARE FOR THE NATION: A SHARED NATIONWIDE 
INTEROPERABILITY ROADMAP (DRAFT) 10–11 (2015), http://www.healthit.gov/sites/default/
files/nationwide-interoperability-roadmap-draft-version-1.0.pdf; see also Evans, supra note 
39, at 14 (citing PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. AND TECH., EXEC. OFFICE OF 
THE PRESIDENT, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT: REALIZING THE FULL POTENTIAL OF HEALTH 
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY TO IMPROVE HEALTHCARE FOR AMERICANS: THE PATH 
FORWARD 39 (2010)). 
151 Id. 
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another.152 Some pieces of information may be present in one system but 
not another; other information may be coded in different fashions (e.g., 
numerical versus qualitative judgments) or using different standards (e.g., 
different ranges indicated by “high” and “low”). Some of these barriers may 
arise through inadvertence, but there is also evidence that some firms 
providing electronic health record systems may use proprietary formats to 
stymy aggregation and use of data from other systems.153 Further 
complicating the interoperability problem, as described below, data about 
different kinds of conditions may be subject to different privacy regimes 
because some information is especially sensitive and thus more strongly 
protected by law.154  
Third, ensuring and maintaining the quality of data is difficult.155 
Especially in administrative claims data, information essential to receiving 
payment may be coded in ways that reflect financial incentives.156 Because 
insurance requires certain diagnoses or procedures to reimburse for 
physician services, health care providers may have incentives to code those 
data in marginal or inappropriate situations, leading to biased data.157 In 
addition, some health terms are inherently imprecise, such as “overweight” 
or “high” blood pressure, and may carry different meanings to different 
practitioners; attempting to distill imprecise categories into numerical 
variables can introduce errors if not done carefully and consistently. Finally, 
                                                 
152 See, e.g., Sharona Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, Big Bad Data: Law, Public Health, 
and Biomedical Databases, 41 J.L. MED. ETHICS 56 (2013); Jan Walker et al., The Value of 
Health Care Information Exchange and Interoperability, 24 HEALTH AFF W5 (2005); W. 
Ed Hammond, The Making and Adoption of Health Data Standards, 24 HEALTH AFF. 1205 
(2005). 
153 See OFFICE OF THE NATIONAL COORDINATOR FOR HEALTH INFORMATION 
TECHNOLOGY, REPORT TO CONGRESS: REPORT ON HEALTH INFORMATION BLOCKING 11–19 
(April 2015), www.healthit.gov/sites/default/files/reports/info_blocking_040915.pdf 
(defining the technique of “information blocking” as “when persons or entities knowingly 
and unreasonably interfere with the exchange or use of electronic health information,” 
describing anecdotal and evidence of its prevalence). 
154 Different legal restrictions on data are discussed in more detail below in Part III, 
infra, but include the Privacy Rule of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability 
Act of 1996 (HIPAA), 45 CFR Parts 160 and 164(A) & (E); the Genetic Information 
Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 (GINA), Pub. L. 110-233, 122 Stat. 881 (2008); and the 
Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002, 44 U.S.C. §§ 3541–3549. 
155 For an overview of quality challenges in medical data, see Sharona Hoffman & 
Andy Podgurski, Big Bad Data: Law, Public Health, and Biomedical Databases, 41 J.L. 
MED. ETHICS 56 (2013); Sharona Hoffman, Symposium, Medical Big Data and Big Data 
Quality Problems, 21 CONN. INS. L.J. 289 (2014). 
156 See ROBERT WACHTER, THE DIGITAL DOCTOR: HOPE, HYPE, AND HARM AT THE 
DAWN OF MEDICINE’S COMPUTER AGE (2015).. 
157 Id. 
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even with adequate care and effort, errors exist in all sources of data, and 
entities using those data for analysis need to account for that error.158 
 
B.  Assistance from federal regulatory initiatives. 
 
Although these challenges are substantial, a number of federal 
legislative and regulatory initiatives are helping to facilitate the use of 
health records in research. These efforts include incentives to promote the 
adoption and use of interoperable health records by caregivers and 
hospitals, creation of a network of data sources for public health monitoring 
of postmarket drug safety issues, and research initiatives in the areas of 
comparative effectiveness studies and personalized medicine.  
 
1. Electronic health records.  
 
The federal government has been actively promoting the use of 
electronic health records (EHRs) for well over a decade in the hope of 
reducing medical errors, reducing costs, and improving the quality of 
care.159 Policy makers have also touted the potential for research use of 
electronic health records as part of a “learning healthcare system” in which 
caregivers continuously adapt their treatment choices in light of ever-
expanding knowledge about healthcare outcomes.160 
The healthcare industry has been extraordinarily slow to adopt 
information technology, lagging far behind the rest of the economy.161 For a 
variety of reasons, paper records and hard copies dominated health records 
well into the first decade of the 21st century.162 President George W. Bush 
called for computerizing health records in his 2004 State of the Union 
                                                 
158 Randomly distributed error may be accounted for by using sufficiently large 
samples, though with subtler or more complex relationships, or with smaller sample sizes, 
the signal can be swamped in noisy data. Systematic biases in data cannot be accounted for 
with larger sample sizes. 
159 See Report and Recommendations from the National Committee on Vital and 
Health Statistics, Information for Health: A Strategy for Building the National Health 
Information Infrastructure (2001), http://aspe.hhs.gov/sp/nhii/documents/NHIIReport2001/.  
160 Id. at 145–160. 
161 Eric G. Poon et al., Assessing the level of healthcare information technology 
adoption in the United States: A snapshot, 6 BMC MED. INFORMATICS & DECISION-
MAKING (Jan. 2006), http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/6/1; Gerard F. Anderson 
et al., Health Care Spending and Use of Information Technology in OECD Countries, 25 
HEALTH AFF. 819-831 (2006). 
162 Institute of Medicine. Crossing the quality chasm: a new health system for the 21st 
century (2001) [IOM Quality Chasm]. 
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address,163 and followed up by creating a new Office of the National 
Coordinator for Health Information Technology (ONC) to pursue this goal, 
with a budget of $42 million.164 But progress remained slow. 
Federal incentives to make use of electronic health records were 
strengthened considerably in the Obama administration,165 largely as a 
result of the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical 
Health Act of 2009 (HITECH Act), passed as part of the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. 166 The HITECH Act codified the 
responsibilities and authority of the ONC within the Department of Health 
and Human Services.167 It charged the ONC with reviewing standards for 
health information exchange, coordinating the activities of the federal 
government concerning health information technology, certifying 
compliance with applicable standards on a voluntary basis, publishing 
reports, and disseminating financial assistance. The legislation also 
established a Health IT Policy Committee168 to make recommendations to 
the ONC for implementing a nationwide health information technology 
infrastructure and a Health IT Standards Committee169 to recommend 
standards, specifications and certification criteria for the exchange of health 
information technology.170 It directed the Secretary of HHS to “assist health 
care providers to adopt, implement, and effectively use certified EHR 
technology that allows for the electronic exchange and use of health 
information” through support of a research center and regional extension 
centers to provide technical assistance, disseminate best practices, and allow 
for the exchange and use of information in compliance with standards.171 
And it provided $30 billion for incentive payments through Medicare and 
Medicaid to reward the adoption and “meaningful use” of EHRs by 
                                                 
163 George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (2004), http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/01/20040120-7.html. 
164 David J. Brailer, Interview: Guiding the Health Information Technology Agenda, 29 
HEALTH AFF. 586-595, 588 (2010). 
165 Id. (noting substantial increase in funding for ONC). The HITECH Act included 
appropriations of $2 billion for the operation of the ONC and an estimated $30 billion in 
Medicare and Medicaid incentive payments for physicians and hospitals that adopt and 
make meaningful use of electronic health records. See Melinda Beeuwkes Buntin et al., 
Health Information Technology: Laying the Infrastructure for National Health Reform, 29 
HEALTH AFF. 1214-19 (2010). 
166 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 
115 (Feb. 17, 2009) (ARRA), Div. A, Title XIII, Div. B, Title IV [HITECH Act]. 
167 ARRA § 3001 
168 ARRA § 3002 
169 ARRA § 3003 
170 ARRA Div. A Tit. I. 
171 ARRA § 3012 
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providers and hospitals.172 Requirements to establish meaningful use 
increase over time, and after 2015, those who fail to make meaningful use 
EHRs are subject to penalties. 
Use of EHRs increased significantly following the implementation of 
HITECH payment incentives,173 although this has hardly been an 
unqualified success story.174 Progress has been much slower in promoting 
health information exchange among providers. A major focus of the ONC 
in the years ahead is to achieve “a nationwide, interoperable health IT 
infrastructure.”175  
HITECH-driven adoption of EHRs offers considerable potential benefits 
for research users. EHRs provide richer and more complete information 
than claims data, and are easier to aggregate for use as research data than 
                                                 
172 ARRA §§ 4101, 4102. See Dept. of Health & Human Serv., Centers for Medicare 
and Medicaid Serv., Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Modifications to the Medicare and 
Medicaid Electronic Health Record (EHR) Incentive Program for 2014 and Other Changes 
to the EHR Incentive Program; and Health Information Technology: Revisions to the 
Certified EHR Technology Definition and EHR Certification Changes Related to 
Standards, 79 Fed. Reg. 52910 (Sept. 4, 2014).  
173 There is some debate about how much of this increase is a result of the resources 
and incentives put in place by the HITECH Act. Compare C.J. Hsiao et al., Office-based 
physicians are responding to incentives and assistance by adopting and using electronic 
health records, 32 HEALTH AFF. 1470, 1470–77 (2013) (rapid growth in adoption and 
meaningful use of basic EHR systems among US ambulatory care physicians from 2010-
2012) and Michael F. Furukawa et al., Despite Substantial Progress in EHR Adoption, 
Health Information Exchange and Patient Engagement Remain Low in Office Settings, 33 
HEALTH AFF. 1672 (2014) (finding greater progress in EHR adoption than in use of 
computerized health information exchange and patient engagement) with David Dranove et 
al., Investment Subsidies and the Adoption of Electronic Medical Records at Hospitals, 
NBER Working Paper No. 20553 (Oct. 2014), http:// www.nber.org/papers/w20553 
(finding that HITECH incentives only modestly increased rate of adoption of EHRs by 
hospitals).  
174 A comparison of survey results in 2012 and 2015 by Accenture show a declining 
share of US doctors that see EMRs and health information exchange as improving the 
quality of treatment decisions, reducing medical errors, and improving health outcomes for 
patients. Accenture, Doctors Survey 2015, US Report, slide 14, http://www.accenture.com/
SiteCollectionDocuments/public-service/accenture-doctors-survey-2015-us-
infographic.pdf. For a narrative account of the impact of electronic medical records on 
providers and hospitals, see WACHTER, supra note 156. 
175 Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology, Connecting 
Health and Care for the Nation: A 10-Year Vision to Achieve an Interoperable Health IT 
Infrastructure (2014), http://www.healthit.gov/sites/default/files/
ONC10yearInteroperabilityConceptPaper.pdf; Office of the National Coordinator for 
Health Information Technology, Connecting Health and Care for the Nation: A Shared 
Nationwide Interoperability Roadmap (Draft Version 1.0 April 2015) (hereinafter 
Interoperability Roadmap), http://www.healthit.gov/sites/default/files/nationwide-
interoperability-roadmap-draft-version-1.0.pdf 
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the paper records used by providers in the past. Although lack of 
interoperability is an ongoing problem, ONC is working to promote the 
development of interoperable EHR products that allow providers to share 
and access a common clinical data set according to common technical 
standards across a nationwide network.176 The networks and infrastructure 
that promote information exchange in the context of clinical care will also 
facilitate access and aggregation by researchers, as ONC recognizes.177 
Indeed, for research purposes it may be possible to achieve considerable 
benefits without nationwide interoperability by using the records of a single 
large provider.178 Data quality may prove to be a more persistent problem in 
making research use of records that some observers claim are optimized for 
(or distorted by) the purpose of justifying billing.179  
 
2. Regulatory use of networked data for observational studies 
 
Payer innovators may also benefit from the infrastructure and 
technology developed to support the FDA Sentinel System, a legislatively 
mandated network of data sources and tools for post-market monitoring of 
the safety of FDA-approved products.  
A series of high-profile drug safety cases (including the Vioxx 
episode)180 provoked members of Congress to ask the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) to review FDA’s organizational structure and 
decision-making process for postmarket drug safety.181 The GAO Report 
was highly critical of FDA’s system of postmarket surveillance, noting that 
it was underfunded182 and relied too heavily on an unreliable system of 
                                                 
176 Interoperability Roadmap, supra note 175, at 13. 
177 Id. at 18–19 (noting that interoperability will promote “a learning health system” 
that improves health “by generating information and knowledge from data captured and 
updated over time”). 
178 E.g., the Kaiser Permanente study of the effects of Vioxx was limited to the records 
of one large, integrated provider. 
179 WACHTER, supra note 156, at 120 (“Much of the data in EHRs continues to be 
collected for the purpose of creating a superior bill, and using this waste product of 
administrative functions for clinical decision making can lead to a GIGO (garbage in, 
garbage out) problem, even with fabulous analytics.”). 
180 Another contemporaneous controversy involved FDA’s delay in notifying the 
public of risks of suicide risks associated with the use of antidepressants by children. [cite] 
181 U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., Report to Requesters: Drug Safety, Improvements 
Needed in FDA’s Postmarket Decision-making and Oversight Process (2006). 
182 Id. at 7-8 (noting that in fiscal year 2005 the FDA Office of Drug Safety had 
expenditures of $26.9 million and a staff of 107, while the Office of New Drugs had 
expenditures of $110.6 million and a staff of 715). 
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adverse event reporting.183 Although at the time FDA had started working 
with the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) to obtain 
access to data on clinical experience and patient outcomes with drugs 
provided under the then-new Medicare prescription drug benefit, it was 
unclear how useful those data would be for surveillance of drug safety.184 
The GAO Report concluded that “FDA will need to continue its efforts to 
develop useful observational studies and to access and use additional 
healthcare databases” and recommended that “Congress should consider 
expanding FDA’s authority to require drug sponsors to conduct postmarket 
studies, such as clinical trials or observational studies.”185  
Around the same time FDA and the Department of Health and Human 
Services asked the Institute of Medicine (IOM) to convene a committee of 
experts to assess the US drug safety system and to make recommendations 
to improve risk assessment, surveillance, and the safe use of drugs.186 The 
IOM Committee report embraced a “lifecycle approach to drug risk and 
benefit” that would not rely exclusively on FDA and drug companies, but 
would also engage the healthcare delivery system, the academic research 
community, and other government agencies in an “ongoing, active 
reassessment of risk and benefit” throughout the life of the product.187 In 
particular, the report recommended an overhaul of FDA’s outdated post-
approval adverse event reporting system and an increase in “programs that 
access and study data from large automated healthcare databases.” Noting 
that preapproval clinical trials “do not provide adequate information about 
the balance of risks and benefits of drugs that are used by many people for 
many years,” the report recommended making more effective use of 
“increasingly high-quality data and scientific capacity” of other public and 
private sector institutions through “a public-private partnership with drug 
sponsors, public and private insurers, for-profit and not-for-profit health 
care provider organizations, consumer groups, and large pharmaceutical 
companies to prioritize, plan, and organize funding for confirmatory drug 
safety and efficacy studies of public health importance.”188 The IOM report 
also echoed the recommendations of the GAO Report that Congress fortify 
FDA’s authorities to take a variety of regulatory actions after drug 
                                                 
183 Id. at 24-25. 
184 Id. at 35 (noting “data quality issues”). 
185 Id. at 36 
186 IOM Comm. on the Assessment of the US Drug Safety System, The Future of Drug 
Safety: Promoting and Protecting the Health of the Public at 2–3 (Washington DC: 
National Academies Press 2007) 
187 Id. at 4–5. 
188 Id. at 7–8. 
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approval.189 
The recommendations in these reports did not speak directly to the role 
of payers in healthcare innovation and regulation. But by highlighting the 
value of healthcare records and observational studies in the ongoing process 
of systematic learning from clinical experience, they set a course that would 
enlarge the role of institutions with stewardship of those records.  
Congress responded to the GAO and IOM reports on drug safety by 
passing the Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007 
(FDAAA 2007),190 a complex piece of legislation that gave FDA significant 
new authorities to oversee the safety of drugs after approval.191 This 
legislation marked a significant shift in the evidentiary basis for FDA 
decision-making away from sole reliance on data from premarket clinical 
trials and adverse event reports submitted by drug companies192 towards 
new sources of data and expertise.193 It directed FDA to collaborate with 
“public, academic, and private entities” to obtain access to “disparate data 
sources” and to “develop validated methods for the establishment of a 
postmarket risk identification and analysis system to link and analyze safety 
data from multiple sources.”194 Once these methods were developed, it 
directed FDA to “establish and maintain procedures for risk identification 
and analysis based on electronic health data.”195  
The electronic health data that these provisions direct FDA to monitor 
are for the most part in the custody of payers. Although the statute charges 
FDA with the job of developing and using the system for surveillance, it 
also contemplates that FDA will work in cooperation with other actors and 
                                                 
189 Id. at 10–12. 
190 Pub. L. No. 110-85, 121 Stat. 823 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 
U.S.C.). 
191 Particularly notable are new authorities to require a drug sponsor to conduct 
postapproval studies or new clinical trials at any time after approval of a new drug 
application if FDA becomes aware of new safety information, 21 U.S.C. § 355(o)(3); to 
require labeling changes to disclose new safety information, 21 U.S.C. § 355(o)(4); and to 
require “risk evaluation and management strategies,” which might include the use of 
Medication Guides and patient package inserts or other communication with providers, 
special training or certification requirements for providers that dispense the product, and 
special monitoring of patients that use the product, if necessary to ensure that the benefits 
of the drug outweigh its risks. 21 U.S.C. § 355-1. 
192 Data from clinical trials remain necessary as part of a new drug application under 
21 U.S.C. §§ 355(b)(1)(A) and 355(d)(1), (5), and (7). Sponsors also have a continuing 
obligation to report adverse events. 
193 For a thoughtful analysis of this shift, see Barbara J. Evans, Seven Pillars of a New 
Evidentiary Paradigm: The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act Enters the Genomic Era, 85 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 419-524 (2010). 
194 21 U.S.C. § 355(k)(3). 
195 21 U.S.C. § 355(k)(3)(C)(i). 
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institutions, and explicitly authorizes FDA to enter into contracts with 
public and private entities to achieve these goals.196 Indeed, it is difficult to 
imagine how FDA could carry out its new statutory directives unless it 
works with the payers who have custody of health data. 
With these marching orders, FDA has been working with outside 
entities, including payers, to establish its Sentinel System for monitoring the 
safety of drugs. It entered into a 5-year contract with the Harvard Pilgrim 
health plan to develop a pilot “mini-Sentinel” system, and recently entered 
into a new contract with Harvard Pilgrim to lead the Sentinel System in 
partnership with over fifty health care organizations and academic 
institutions.197  
Mini-Sentinel has already facilitated the development of innovative 
information using payer data. In 2010, FDA launched a study of the risk of 
intussusception198 in infants receiving rotavirus vaccines after ambiguous 
postmarketing studies conducted by the vaccine sponsors.199 FDA used 
Mini-Sentinel to access payer information from Aetna, Healthcore, and 
Humana relating to over 1.3 million vaccine administrations.200 Researchers 
found a small but significant increase in intussusception, enough to require 
labeling changes for the vaccines.201 Although this is a success story for 
Mini-Sentinel, it also highlights the challenge of this type of network: 
someone must know to ask the question, and currently, the only one asking 
the questions is FDA. 
Sentinel is an important public health initiative to develop and utilize 
new technology and data sources in a distributed network to monitor safety. 
Although the purpose of the Sentinel System is to monitor drug safety, this 
unique resource is currently being used for other public health purposes as 
well,202 and FDA officials have announced plans to make the Sentinel 
infrastructure—though not the data themselves—available to other users in 
the future as part of a national data infrastructure.203  
                                                 
196 21 U.S.C. § 355(k)(3)(C)(v). 
197 See Health Affairs, Health Affairs Health Policy Brief, The FDA’s Sentinel 
Initiative. (June 4, 2015) [Health Affairs Sentinel Brief], http://healthaffairs.org/
healthpolicybriefs/brief_pdfs/healthpolicybrief_139.pdf 
198 Intussusception is a serious medical condition in which part of the intestine folds 
into another section of the intestine. 
199 U.S. FDA, FDA Releases Final Study Results of a Mini-Sentinel Postlicensure 
Observational Study of Rotavirus Vaccines and Intussusception (June 13, 2013), http:// 
www.fda.gov/BiologicsBloodVaccines/SafetyAvailability/ucm356758.htm. 
200 W. Katherine Yih et al., Intussusception Risk after Rotavirus Vaccination in U.S. 
Infants, 370 N. ENGL. J. MED. 503 (2014) 
201 Id. 
202 Id. at 4. 
203 Janet Woodcock, Another important step in FDA’s journey towards enhanced 
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More broadly, Sentinel is also a significant research initiative that 
leverages public resources, public health goals, and legal authorities to 
support the development of technology that has other uses in biomedical 
research. The statute explicitly calls for the development and validation of 
new analytical methods.204 More generally, it sets goals that drive the 
development of new capabilities. Because this initiative looks to establish a 
network of data sources, it creates new partnerships among institutions, 
including payers, that might benefit from other collaborations outside the 
Sentinel System. By setting ambitious goals for utilizing new technological 
strategies, it identifies obstacles (such as data quality and interoperability 
and privacy) and challenges participants to develop strategies to overcome 
them.205 And it engages in this research effort a set of institutions that have 
a direct stake in the research, but might not otherwise have taken on such a 
significant role in health R&D. 
 
3. Government research programs 
 
The federal government has also used its role as research sponsor to 
establish new research programs that organize, subsidize, and direct 
research using health records. These programs provide subsidies and 
training and build networks across public, private, and academic 
institutions, providing a foundation for future research. 
 
a. Comparative effectiveness research 
 
The Affordable Care Act (2010) authorized the establishment of the 
Patient Centered Outcomes Research Institute (PCORI) to oversee and set 
guidelines for comparative effectiveness research. The legislation specifies 
that PCORI will be a nonprofit, nongovernmental research institute with an 
initial appropriation from Congress and subsequent funding from a new fee 
on health insurers until it sunsets in 2019.206 
                                                                                                                            
safety through full-scale “active surveillance,” FDA Voice (Dec. 30, 2014), 
http://blogs.fda.gov/fdavoice/index.php/2014/12/another-important-step-in-fdas-journey-
towards-enhanced-safety-through-full-scale-active-surveillance/.  
204 21 U.S.C. § 355(k)(3)(B). 
205 Health Affairs Sentinel Brief, supra note 197, at 4. 
206 The choice to set up an organization outside the existing science agencies is 
interesting, and likely explained by the politics of holding together a fragile coalition to 
pass the Affordable Care Act in the face of industry anxiety about the likely impact on 
coverage decisions and prices for their products. The House version of the ACA called for 
a government entity housed within the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality 
(AHRQ), which in turn is a part of the Department of Health and Human Services. The 
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PCORI is governed by a 19-member board including patients, 
caregivers, and representatives of hospitals, insurers and product-
developing firms. It is distinctive in its focus on engagement with 
stakeholders including clinical and patient communities to ensure the 
relevance and impact of research. 
The PCORI provisions of the ACA specifically target the same 
technical difficulties that payers would confront in their own comparative 
effectiveness research,207 creating communities to address these difficulties 
with federal funding. PCORI has awarded $100 million to establish a 
national patient-centered outcomes research network, PCORnet, composed 
of 11 large healthcare organization networks and 18 patient-group-based 
networks, that will generate interoperable datasets to support multinetwork 
studies, and it is actively funding studies.  
PCORI occupies a politically precarious niche in the biomedical 
innovation system. There have been repeated proposals to eliminate PCORI. 
Some critics charge that it is redundant to the ongoing efforts of other 
agencies. But its focus on engaging clinical caregivers and private payers in 
the research distinguishes it from other more academically oriented research 
programs, and perhaps offers the prospect of training and engaging a new 
set of institutions that will continue their involvement in research in the 
future. 
The political compromises necessary to pass the ACA constrained 
PCORI with the following ambiguous statutory prohibition: 
 
The Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute . . . shall not 
develop or employ a dollars-per-quality adjusted life year (or similar 
measure that discounts the value of a life because of an individual’s 
disability) as a threshold to establish what type of health care is cost 
effective or recommended. The Secretary shall not utilize such an 
                                                                                                                            
Senate Finance Committee version of the ACA called for a nongovernmental entity, and 
that is the version that was ultimately signed into law. Kavita Patel, Health Reform’s 
Tortuous Route to the Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute, 29:10 HEALTH AFF. 
1777, 1777–82 (2010). 
207 The ACA amended the Public Health Service Act to add a new section 937(f) 
authorizing the Secretary of HHS to build data capacity for the conduct of comparative 
effectiveness research: 
The Secretary shall provide for the coordination of relevant Federal health programs to 
build data capacity for comparative clinical effectiveness research, including the 
development and use of clinical registries and health outcomes research data networks, 
in order to develop and maintain a comprehensive, interoperable data network to 
collect, link, and analyze data on outcomes and effectiveness from multiple sources, 
including electronic health records. 
ACA § 6301(b). 
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adjusted life year (or such a similar measure) as a threshold to determine 
coverage, reimbursement, or incentive programs under title XVIII. 208 
 
This language reflects concerns by some opponents of comparative 
effectiveness research that it would lead to rationing or withholding of care 
from disabled people based on assessments of government bureaucrats that 
some lives are worth less than others. Some commentators read this 
language broadly to prohibit consideration of cost-effectiveness in PCORI-
funded research.209 Whatever limits the statutory language imposes on 
PCORI, it does not constrain other institutions outside the government. 
Thus private insurers could develop their own cost-effectiveness thresholds 
and use them to make coverage determinations without violating the law. 
Indeed, the statute explicitly states that “Nothing in this section shall be 
construed . . . to permit the Institute to mandate coverage, reimbursement, 
or other policies for any public or private payer . . . .”210 
But the statute directly prohibits use of dollars-per-quality adjusted life 
years as thresholds for coverage determinations under Medicare. Since 
private insurers often replicate Medicare coverage determinations, the 
constraints on “the Secretary” may effectively determine private sector 
moves as well. These provisions may undermine the potential of PCORI 
research to drive cost-savings in practice, but should not significantly 
constrain its research mission.  
 
b. Personalized medicine 
Another important source of research funding that is likely to accelerate 
progress in overcoming technical obstacles to payer innovation is the 
National Institutes of Health (NIH). NIH is, of course, the largest source of 
funding for biomedical research, and an important driver of personalized 
medicine research. Two NIH initiatives particularly stand out: the Precision 
                                                 
208 ACA § 1182, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320e-1(e). 
209 Professor Nicholas Bagley, while acknowledging that some legislators sought to 
impose just such a limitation, reads the enacted statutory language more narrowly. In this 
reading, the statute merely prevents the development or employment of a cost-effectiveness 
threshold based on dollars-per-quality adjusted life years or similar measures. So long as 
PCORI does not develop or employ such a threshold to establish what type of health care is 
cost effective or recommended, nothing in the statutory language prevents it from 
compiling, considering, and comparing costs of the treatments that it evaluates. Nicholas 
Bagley, Who says PCORI can’t do cost effectiveness? The Incidental Economist (Oct. 14, 
2013), http://theincidentaleconomist.com/wordpress/who-says-pcori-cant-do-cost-
effectiveness/ 
210 ACA § 6301(a), codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320e (j)(1)(A).] 
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Medicine Initiative, and the eMERGE network. 
President Obama announced the Precision Medicine Initiative in his 
2015 State of the Union address. The aim of the initiative is to drive 
personalized medicine forward through public-private partnerships, 
including work with drug companies on cancer genomics.211 Eventually, the 
initiative aims to develop a cohort of at least one million Americans with 
full genomic and health data to be used for research. The President called 
for an initial $215 million in funding to drive this research.212 Crucially, the 
goals of the program included a significant focus on infrastructure for 
research, including developing the cohort, creating information 
management and analysis tools, and helping cement relationships between 
public and private entities in the area.213 
Another particularly important NIH initiative in this area is the 
eMERGE (electronic MEdical Records and GEnomics) Network, a 
consortium of research institutions organized and funded by the National 
Institute for Human Genome Research that brings together researchers with 
wide-ranging expertise in genomics, statistics, ethics, informatics, and 
clinical medicine.214 
The eMERGE Network aims to combine information from electronic 
health records with genotype data from DNA biorepositories to identify 
relationships between genetic variations and health outcomes and to assess 
the utility of genotype information for clinical use.215 To facilitate this 
research the eMERGE network has had to address a number of issues with 
legal implications, including developing standardized patient consent 
language and best practices for sharing patient genetic data, and has formed 
working groups to address these issues.216 eMERGE’s sponsor, the National 
Human Genome Research Institute, has a long history of sponsoring 
                                                 
211 See Francis S. Collins & Harold Varmus, A New Initiative on Precision Medicine, 
372 NEW ENG. J. MED. 793, 793 (2015); Nat’l Inst. of Health, Near-Term Goals, http://
nihprod.cit.nih.gov/precisionmedicine/goals.htm (last updated October 13, 2015). 
212 Press Release, The White House, Fact Sheet: President Obama’s Precision 
Medicine Initiative (Jan. 15, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/01/
30/fact-sheet-president-obama-s-precision-medicine-initiative. 
213 Collins & Varmus, supra note 211. 
214 eMERGE Network, https://emerge.mc.vanderbilt.edu/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2016); 
Catherine A. McCarty et al., The eMERGE Network: A Consortium of Biorepositories 
Linked to Electronic Medical Records Data for Conducting Genomic Studies, 4 BMC MED. 
GENOMICS 13 (2011). 
215 eMERGE Network, About eMERGE, https://emerge.mc.vanderbilt.edu/about-
emerge/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2016).  
216 See Laura M. Beskow et al., Model Consent Language (2009), 
http://www.ninds.nih.gov/research/clinical_research/application_process/eMerge_model_la
nguage.pdf. 
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research on ethical and legal issues associated with human genome research 
and incorporating best practices into research.217 
The tools and databases created by the eMERGE network have also 
been used by participating institutions in collaborations outside the network, 
suggesting spillover benefits in promoting further research outside the 
immediate scope of sponsored activity. For instance, eMERGE researchers 
developed the Phenotype KnowledgeBase, or PheKB, a collaborative 
environment used to collect, validate, and share electronic algorithms for 
learning about patient phenotype based on health data.218 Similarly, 
eMERGE’s model consent form can be used by any organization, including 
integrated systems, collecting genomic data for future analyses. Finally, 
eMERGE’s privacy-protecting data collection framework offers a pathway 
for future data-collection endeavors by payers or data aggregators.219 This 
last is a particularly relevant example of the way that federal research 
initiatives can facilitate payer innovation, because it bears on a large non-
technological hurdle to that innovation: privacy rules protecting patient 
data. 
 
III. LEGAL PRIVACY OBSTACLES: HIPAA AND HITECH 
 
Privacy laws, principally the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA),220 present a challenging obstacle to 
the use of patient health information for research purposes.  
HIPAA aimed to facilitate the flow of information for health care and 
administrative purposes (such as claims processing), while protecting 
patient privacy by restricting uses and disclosure for other purposes.221 The 
Department of Health and Human Services has elaborated upon these 
general statutory provisions in detailed rules,222 including a Privacy Rule223 
                                                 
217 See Jean E. McEwen et al., The Ethical, Legal, and Social Implications Program of 
the National Human Genome Research Institute: Reflections on an Ongoing Experiment*, 
15 ANN. REV. GENOMICS HUM. GENET. 481 (2014). 
218 See PheKB, https://phekb.org/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2016). 
219 See Ioana Danciu et al., Secondary Use of Clinical Data: The Vanderbilt Approach, 
52 J. BIOMED. INFORM. 28 (2014) (discussing data architecture and privacy-protecting 
collection practices); Abel N. Kho et al., Design and Implementation of a Privacy 
Preserving Electronic Health Record Linkage Tool in Chicago, J. AM. MED. INFORM. 
ASSOC. ocv038 (2015) (implementing similar system to collect data in Chicago). 
220 Pub. L. No. 104-191, 100 Stat. 2548 (hereinafter HIPAA). 
221 See Nicolas P. Terry, Big Data Proxies and Health Privacy Exceptionalism, 24 
HEALTH MATRIX 65, 67-69 (describing basic architecture of privacy protection under 1996 
statute). 
222 Section 264 of HIPAA called for the Secretary of Health and Human Services (the 
Secretary) to submit detailed recommendations to Congress with respect to the privacy of 
 
49
Eisenberg and Price:
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2016
 PROMOTING HEALTHCARE INNOVATION 49 
that sets limits on disclosure and use of “protected health information”224 by 
“covered entities”225 and their “business associates.”226 Health insurance 
plans, providers, and health care clearinghouses are all “covered entities.”227 
Business associates include anyone who, “on behalf of a covered entity,” 
receives protected health information from the covered entity to perform 
“legal, actuarial, accounting, consulting, data aggregation . . . management, 
administrative, accreditation, or financial services.”228 “Protected health 
information” includes both medical and billing records.229 The baseline rule 
under HIPAA is that all use or disclosure of protected health information is 
prohibited unless it is specifically allowed.230 In addition, the Privacy Rule 
requires reasonable efforts to limit uses or disclosures of protected 
information to “the minimum necessary” to accomplish the intended 
purpose.231 The Privacy Rule thus creates substantial hurdles for 
aggregating data from different sources, and even for internal use of data by 
                                                                                                                            
individually identifiable health information within twelve months of the enactment of 
HIPAA, and further provided that if legislation governing privacy standards were not 
enacted within three years, the Secretary “shall promulgate final regulations containing 
such standards” within 42 months after the enactment of HIPAA. HIPAA, supra note 220, 
§ 263.  
223 45 C.F.R. Parts 160, 164. 
224 The HIPAA Privacy Rule generally defines “protected health information” as 
“individually identifiable health information.” 45 C.F.R. § 160.103. 
225 “Covered entities” is defined at 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 to include a health plan, a 
health care clearinghouse, or a health care provider who transmits any health information in 
electronic form. 
226 45 C.F.R. § 160.103. 
227 45 C.F.R. § 160.102. Only providers who transmit health information in electronic 
form in connection with certain transactions are “covered entities.” Id. Health care 
clearinghouses are entities that engage in the data integration process described above, 
changing information between different formats to facilitate its use in different 
environments. 45 CFR § § 160.103, 164.500(b). 
228 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (emphasis added). 
229 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 defines “protected health information” as “individually 
identifiable health information … that is (i) transmitted by electronic media; (ii) maintained 
in electronic media; or (iii) transmitted or maintained in any other form or medium.” It 
broadly defines “health information” to mean “any information, including genetic 
information, whether oral or recorded in any form or medium, that (1) is created or 
received by a health care provider, health plan, public health authority, employer, life 
insurer, school or university, or health care clearinghouse; and (2) relates to the past, 
present, or future physical or mental health or condition of an individual; the provision of 
health care to an individual; or the past, present, or future payment for the provision of 
health care to an individual.” 
230 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.502. 
231 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(b) This limitation does not apply to disclosures to providers 
for the purposes of providing care, or various other purposes required by the statute. Id. § 
164.502(b)(2). 
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a covered entity, but it is limited in a number of ways that leave room for 
some research use of protected information.232  
Complicating the picture, different kinds of health information are 
subject to different rules. The Privacy Rule itself provides additional 
protection for psychotherapy notes233 while allowing more stringent privacy 
protections under various state laws.234 Some state statutes, for example, 
provide more stringent additional protections against disclosure of 
information related to HIV status and treatment.235 Other federal statutes 
provide additional protection for genetic information,236 substance abuse 
treatment records, 237 and HIV status beyond the HIPAA baseline.238 This 
                                                 
232 See 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.502 (general rule prohibiting use or disclosure of protected 
health information except as permitted or required by the Privacy Rule); 164.508 (defining 
uses and disclosures for which an authorization is required);164.512 (defining uses and 
disclosures for which an authorization is not required).  
233 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(a)(2) (prohibiting disclosure without specific written 
authorization).  
234 45 C.F.R. § 160.203(b); 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2(c)(2). 
235 E.g., New York Public Health Law § 2783 
236 Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 
881 (GINA). The protections of GINA are particularly notable because of the importance 
of genetic information to researchers seeking to understand the heterogenous responses of 
different patients to healthcare interventions. GINA prohibits discrimination in health 
insurance coverage based on an individual’s genetic information. It also states that genetic 
information is health information under HIPAA contains new privacy protections for 
genetic information and prohibits insurers from using or disclosing genetic information for 
underwriting purposes. Id. § 105. While GINA does not impose specific restrictions on use 
or disclosure of genetic information for research purposes, insurers are prohibited from 
requiring patients to undergo genetic testing. Id. § 101(b). In addition, at least one 
commentator has expressed concern that doctors will keep genetic information out of 
insurer-accessible medical records to prevent GINA-prohibited discrimination. Eric A. 
Feldman, The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA): Public Policy and 
Medical Practice in the Age of Personalized Medicine, 27 J. GEN. INTERN. MED. 743, 745 
(2012). 
237 Under 42 U.S.C. § 290dd-2(a), “Records of the identity, diagnosis, prognosis, or 
treatment of any patient which are maintained in connection with the performance of any 
program or activity relating to substance abuse education, prevention, training, treatment, 
rehabilitation, or research, which is conducted, regulated, or directly or indirectly assisted 
by any department or agency of the United States shall, . . . be confidential and be 
disclosed only for the purposes and under the circumstances expressly authorized under 
subsection (b) of this section.” The only statutory exception is for a “bona fide medical 
emergency,” id. § 290dd-2(b)(2)(A), but regulations provide that information can be shared 
between personnel within a program or its direct administrative supervisor for substance 
abuse treatment purposes. 42 C.F.R. § 2.12(c)(3). Less protective state laws are preempted, 
but more protective state laws are not. 42 C.F.R. § 2.20. 
238 For a helpful overview, see Timothy S. Jost, Constraints on Sharing Mental Health 
and Substance-Use Treatment Information Imposed by Federal and State Medical Records 
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uneven landscape of privacy restrictions further complicates the challenge 
of assembling broad, comprehensive, longitudinal health records. Different 
types of health information are fragmented into different privacy siloes, and 
the legal privacy protections change as patients move between states or 
develop new medical conditions. 
The Privacy Rule nonetheless allows some room for innovators to use 
health data. Some uses of protected health information are generally 
permitted, while specific waiver and authorization provisions enable 
normally prohibited uses. Moreover, the HITECH Act of 2009 has modified 
HIPAA to reshape—and hopefully, to reduce—some hurdles to innovation. 
 
A.  Normally permitted uses 
 
The wording of the Privacy Rule creates considerable confusion about 
the extent to which the study of healthcare records to improve future patient 
care qualifies for the more favorable treatment for “health care operations” 
rather than falling into the less favored category of “research.” The Privacy 
Rule permits a covered entity to use or disclose protected health information 
“for treatment, payment or health care operations,”239 so long as it makes 
“reasonable efforts to limit protected health information to the minimum 
necessary to accomplish the intended purpose.”240 Although the Rule 
explicitly allows use of protected health information for “quality assessment 
and improvement activities, including outcomes evaluation and 
development of clinical guidelines,” such studies may not have the primary 
purpose of “obtaining [] generalizable knowledge.”241 These provisions are 
tough to reconcile, since it would be irresponsible to develop clinical 
guidelines on the basis of anything short of generalizable knowledge.242 At 
                                                                                                                            
Privacy Laws in INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE (US) COMMITTEE ON CROSSING THE QUALITY 
CHASM: ADAPTATION TO MENTAL HEALTH AND ADDICTIVE DISORDERS (Washington DC: 
National Academies Press 2006). 
239 45 C.F.R. § 164.506(a). 
240 164.502(b). The definitions set forth in the Privacy Rule make it clear that the 
exception for “health care operations” does not cover “research.” “Health care operations” 
is defined to include “conducting quality assessment and improvement activities, including 
outcomes evaluation and development of clinical guidelines, provided that the obtaining of 
generalizable knowledge is not the primary purpose of any studies resulting from such 
activities.” 45 C.F.R. § 164.501.  
241 45 C.F.R. § 164.501. 
242 See IOM, Beyond the HIPAA Privacy Rule: Enhancing Privacy, Improving Health 
Through Research (2009) [IOM Beyond HIPAA], 131–39 (discussing “somewhat artificial 
distinction between health research and some closely related health care practices, such as 
… quality improvement activities ….”); see also Stacey A. Tovino, The Use and 
Disclosure of Protected Health Information for Research Under the Hippa Privacy Rule: 
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a minimum, one might expect that as the analysis of health outcomes to 
improve clinical care becomes more scientifically rigorous (and its 
conclusions therefore more generalizable), it may look less like permissible 
“health care operations” and more like restricted “research.”243 Notably, the 
21st Century Cures Act, currently under consideration by Congress, would 
resolve this issue by “revis[ing] or clarify[ing]” that research, “including 
studies whose purpose is to obtain generalizable knowledge,” falls within 
the definition of health care operations.244  
De-identified data. De-identified data isn’t covered at all by the Privacy 
Rule. Even for activities that count as “research,” the Privacy Rule applies 
only to “individually identifiable health information” and not to “[h]ealth 
information that does not identify an individual and with respect to which 
there is no reasonable basis to believe that the information can be used to 
identify an individual.”245 Although advances in information technology 
have made it increasingly easy to re-identify individuals on the basis of 
limited information,246 the Privacy Rule nonetheless provides a safe harbor 
that qualifies data as de-identified if seventeen pieces of identifying 
information are removed.247 De-identifying data is a key way to navigate 
HIPAA restrictions even for government entities; when California’s health 
                                                                                                                            
Unrealized Patient Autonomy and Burdensome Government Regulation, 49 S.D. L. REV. 
447, 450–55 (2004) (discussing the applicability of HIPAA restrictions to research). 
243 “Research” is separately defined as “a systematic investigation, including research 
development, testing, and evaluation designed to develop or contribute to generalizable 
knowledge.” 45 C.F.R. § 164.501. 
244 21st Century Cures Act, H.R. 6 (2015), 114th Congress, § 1124, available at 
https://www.congress.gov/114/bills/hr6/BILLS-114hr6ih.xml. The Act was approved by 
the House of Representatives on July 10, 2015. 
245 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(a). 
246 See Daniel C. Barth-Jones, “The Re-identification of Governor William Weld’s 
Medical Information: A Critical Re-examination of Health Data Identification Risks and 
Privacy Problems, Then and Now" (Working Paper June 4, 2012), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2076397; see also Paul Ohm, Broken 
Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. 
REV. 1701, 1716–31, 1736–38 (2009) (describing re-identification generally and in the 
HIPAA context). 
247 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(b)(2)(i). The list includes names, geographic subdivisions 
smaller than a state, certain dates directly related to an individual, telephone and fax 
numbers, email addresses, social security numbers, medical record numbers, health plan 
beneficiary numbers, and other identifying numbers and codes, biometric identifiers, full-
face photographic images, and “any other unique identifying number, characteristic, or 
code, except as permitted by paragraph(c) of this section.” 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(b)(2)(i)(A)-
(R). An exception to the final catch-all item permits the covered entity to assign a non-
substantive code to allow the covered entity itself to reidentify the information so long as 
the covered entity does not use or disclose the code for any other purpose nor disclose the 
mechanism for re-identification. 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(c).  
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exchange marketplace, Covered California, begins collecting payer data on 
its 1.4 million customers, the data will go to a third-party analytics 
company, and the state itself will receive only de-identified data.248  
However, de-identification brings its own problems. The list of 
identifiers includes information that may be relevant to researchers, 
including dates, ages, and biometric identifiers; excluding this information 
limits the value of the data.249 Moreover, retention of identifiers may be 
necessary to link data from different sources and over time.250 The most 
straightforward way to integrate information from different sources—a key 
technical challenge discussed above—is to use unique identifying 
information from individual records. If Miles Vorkosigan’s records from 
different providers and payers are related only by the fact that those records 
all pertain to Miles Vorkosigan, the easiest way to link those records is 
through his name.251 Removing identifying information prevents this 
aggregation. There are ways around this problem involving translating 
identifiable information into unique identifiers through a one-way encoding 
process, but they add technical complexity and require at least some form of 
centralized infrastructure. 
Limited data sets. The Privacy Rule provides a less restrictive 
alternative allowing covered entities to use or disclose “limited data sets” 
without the need for authorization “only for the purposes of research, public 
health, or health care operations.”252 The list of identifiers that must be 
excluded to qualify as a limited data is less restrictive than the exclusions 
required to qualify for the de-identification safe harbor.253 A covered entity 
may use or disclose a limited data set only if it enters into a “data use 
agreement” obliging the data recipient to use or disclose the protected 
health information only for “limited purposes” permitted by the Rule.254 
                                                 
248 Chad Terhune, California’s Obamacare Exchange to Collect Insurance Data on 
Patients, LOS ANGELES TIMES (June 21, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-
obamacare-patient-privacy-20150622-story.html. 
249 For example, the requirement for removal of any geographic identifier smaller than 
a state can significantly limit the assembly of detailed geographic health information. Id. § 
164.514(b)(2)(i)(B). For a discussion of this problem see IOM Beyond HIPAA, supra note 
242, at 230–33. 
250 IOM Beyond HIPAA, supra note 242, at 177-179. 
251 See LOIS M. BUJOLD, BROTHERS IN ARMS (Baen Books, 1989) (discussing the 
potential consequences of access to uniquely-identified biomedical information and 
samples). 
252 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(e). 
253 Id. § 164.514(e)(2). Unlike a fully de-identified data set, a limited data set may 
include date, town, state, and zip code; there is also no catch-all category prohibiting “any 
other unique identifying number, characteristic, or code.” Id. 
254 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(e)(4)(i). 
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The agreement must specify permitted uses and disclosures, require 
safeguards to prevent further use or disclosure, and prohibit recipients from 
identifying or contacting the individuals whose health information has been 
disclosed.255  
Public health activities. The Privacy Rule explicitly permits use or 
disclosure of protected health information for certain public health 
activities, including disclosure to a public health authority for surveillance 
purposes.256 This allows disclosures to FDA for postmarketing safety 
monitoring under the Sentinel Initiative.257 A related provision permits 
disclosure of information about an FDA-regulated product or activity to its 
FDA sponsor in order to collect or report adverse events and to conduct post 
marketing surveillance.258 While this lets drug companies access 
information about their own products, it does not permit disclosure of data 
about other treatments that could serve as controls, limiting the possibility 
of comparative effectiveness research.259  
The foregoing limitations260 on the Privacy Rule allow some use of 
healthcare information in research, although compliance with the conditions 
necessary to qualify for these limitations may be burdensome and may limit 
the scope of research. 
 
B.   Authorization and waivers 
 
In addition to normally permitted uses, the Privacy Rule enables allows 
otherwise prohibited uses and disclosures in two circumstances. First, 
individual patients may authorize any use of their protected health 
information. Second, researchers may obtain waivers of HIPAA 
requirements from an Institutional Review Board or a Privacy Board. 
The Privacy Rule permits individual patients to authorize the use of 
their protected health information for any purpose, including use in research 
                                                 
255 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(e)(4)(ii). 
256 45 C.F.R. §164.512(b)(i). 
257 See Kristen Rosati, Barbara Evans & Deven McGraw, White Paper, HIPAA and 
Common Rule Compliance in the Mini-Sentinel Pilot, http://www.mini-sentinel.org/
work_products/About_Us/HIPAA_and_CommonRuleCompliance_in_the_Mini-
SentinelPilot.pdf.  
258 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(b)(iii). 
259 Barbara J. Evans, The Ethics of Postmarketing Observational Studies of Drug 
Safety Under Section 505(o)(3) of the Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act, 38 AM. J.L. & MED. 
577, 588-89 (2012). 
260 Other, narrower limitations also exist, such as provisions permitting the use of 
protected health information to prepare a research protocol and the use of decedents’ 
information if necessary for research, 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(i)(1)(ii)-(iii). 
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studies.261 The requirements for a valid authorization are exacting. It must 
include a “specific and meaningful” description of the information to be 
used or disclosed; identify those using, disclosing, or receiving the 
information; describe each purpose of the requested use or disclosure; and 
specify an expiration of the authorization (which, for research uses, may be 
“none”).262 The authorization must be written in plain language and signed 
by the individual.263 It must include statements advising the individual of 
his or her right to revoke the authorization in writing,264 explaining any 
consequences to the individual of refusing to sign the authorization,265 and 
warning of the potential for information to be redisclosed by the recipient 
and no longer protected under the Privacy Rule.266  
Getting authorizations presents practical problems, but those may be 
surmountable. Unfortunately, the use of individual authorizations presents a 
different and less tractable problem for research use. There are significant 
medical differences between patients who are willing to authorize the use of 
their information and those who are not.267 The need for individual 
authorizations is thus a source of selection bias that distorts the results of 
observational studies, making them less informative than they would be if 
patients did not have the opportunity to remove their health information 
from the study. 
An Institutional Review Board or a Privacy Board268 may waive the 
authorization requirement for research studies that require such waivers and 
meet specified criteria.269 This can mitigate the serious problem of selection 
                                                 
261 45 C.F.R. § 164.508.  
262 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(c) 
263 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(c)(3), (c)(1)(vi) 
264 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(c)(2)(i)(A) 
265 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(c)(2)(ii) 
266 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(c)(2)(iii). 
267 IOM Beyond HIPAA, supra note 242, at 209–214. It may be, for example, that 
patients with prescriptions for Viagra are less willing to authorize the use of their health 
records in research than other patients. 
268 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(i)(1)(i)(A), (B). A detailed analysis of the interactions of 
Privacy Boards (privacy-ensuring entities created by the HIPAA Privacy Rule) and 
Institutional Review Boards (research oversight entities created under the Common Rule 
governing human subjects research) is beyond the scope of this Article. For overviews of 
each, see NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARDS AND THE 
HIPAA PRIVACY RULE, http://privacyruleandresearch.nih.gov/irbandprivacyrule.asp 
(2004), and NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, PRIVACY BOARDS AND THE HIPAA 
PRIVACY RULE, http://privacyruleandresearch.nih.gov/privacy_boards_hipaa_privacy_
rule.asp (2004), respectively. 
269 These criteria include that the use or disclosure involves no more than a minimal 
risk to privacy of individuals based on an adequate plan to protect from improper use or 
disclosure, an adequate plan to destroy the identifiers at the earliest opportunity consistent 
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bias, but the need for Board review imposes costs and delays. Survey data 
indicate that many researchers have found it very difficult to obtain Privacy 
Rule waivers.270 Moreover, ambiguity in the waiver criteria creates 
uncertainty, especially for studies that aggregate data from multiple sources 
and may therefore require approval from multiple Boards that may interpret 
the Privacy Rule differently.271  
 
C.  The HITECH Act and amendments to the Privacy Rule 
 
The HITECH Act fortified the privacy protections of HIPAA in a 
number of ways, including applying its provisions to a broader set of 
entities,272 requiring notification to individuals of breaches,273 and 
strengthening enforcement provisions.274 It also imposed a new statutory 
requirement for individual authorization for the sale of protected health 
information,275 subject to certain exceptions, including sale for research 
purposes for a price that “reflects the cost of preparation and transmittal of 
the data.”276  
In the course of amending the Privacy Rule to comply with the HITECH 
Act requirements,277 HHS made a number of changes and interpretations to 
                                                                                                                            
with conduct of the research, and adequate written assurances that the protected health 
information will not be reused or disclosed to any other person or entity, and that the 
research could not practicably be conducted without the waiver and without access to and 
use of the protected health information. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(i)(2). 
270 IOM Beyond HIPAA, supra note 242, at 223. 
271 IOM Beyond HIPAA, supra note 242, at 169–170, 221–227. 
272 HITECH Act, supra note 166, §§ 13404 (extending provisions of Privacy Rule to 
business associates of covered entities) and 13408 (requiring that covered entities enter into 
business associate contracts with organizations such as health information exchanges that 
provide data transmission of protected health information to such covered entities). 
273 HITECH Act, supra note 166, § 13402 (requiring notification to individuals of 
breaches) 
274 HITECH Act, supra note 166, § 13410 
275 Id. § 13405(d)(1). 
276 Id. § 13405(d)(2)(B). Other exceptions include sales for public health activities, 
treatment, health care operations, remuneration to a business associate, provision to an 
individual of the individual’s protected health information, and other similar exceptions to 
be specified by the Secretary of Health and Human Services. § 13405(d)(2)(A)-(G). See 
also Barbara J. Evans, Sustainable Access to Data for Postmarketing Medical Product 
Safety Surveillance under the Amended HIPAA Privacy Rule, 24 HEALTH MATRIX 11 
(2014) (arguing that the cost provisions in HITECH fall short of allowing sustainable 
access to postmarket surveillance medical data). 
277 DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., MODIFICATIONS TO THE HIPAA PRIVACY, 
SECURITY, ENFORCEMENT, AND BREACH NOTIFICATION RULES UNDER THE HEALTH 
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY FOR ECONOMIC AND CLINICAL HEALTH ACT AND THE 
GENETIC INFORMATION NONDISCRIMINATION ACT; OTHER MODIFICATION TO THE HIPAA 
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facilitate authorizations for use of health records in research.278 HHS 
clarified that the receipt of grant funding to perform a research study that 
involves provision of protected health information is not considered a sale 
of protected health information.279 In another change not explicitly required 
by the statute, HHS amended the Privacy Rule to permit covered entities to 
combine authorizations for use and disclosure of health information with 
related permission to use biospecimens,280 and modified its interpretation of 
the Privacy Rule to permit use of a single authorization form for multiple 
future studies.281 These changes minimize bureaucratic costs by allowing a 
single authorization to cover multiple studies, and even to include future 
health information.  
 
Overall, HIPAA creates substantial legal barriers to innovation by 
payers.282 In addition to direct legal restrictions, privacy rules also 
exacerbate technical challenges, as when de-identification makes it harder 
to integrate information from different sources. Although recent legislation 
and modifications to the HIPAA Privacy Rule have made research uses 
easier in some respects, more reform may be necessary to exploit the 
promise of research using health records.283  
                                                                                                                            
RULES, 78 Fed. Reg. 5566 (Jan. 25, 2013) [2013 HIPAA Modifications]. 
278 For a critical analysis of these provisions by a noted renowned privacy advocate, 
see Mark A. Rothstein, HIPAA Privacy Rule 2.0, J.L. Med. & Ethics 525-528 (Summer 
2013) 
279 See 2013 HIPAA Modifications, supra note 277, 78 Fed. Reg. at 5606. 
280 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(b)(3).  
281 The new interpretation is explained at 2013 HIPAA Modifications, supra note 277, 
78 Fed. Reg. at 5611-13. 
282 See Tovino, supra note 216, at 450 (Describing HIPAA’s restrictions on research as 
“onerous”). 
283 We would be remiss if we did not mention the other side of this argument. Others 
have argued that the privacy protections are strikingly inadequate to actually safeguard 
patient privacy in the age of electronic medical records and Big Data.283 See, e.g., Sharona 
Hoffman, Electronic Health Records and Research: Privacy Versus Scientific Priorities, 10 
AM. J. BIOETH. 19 (2010); Sharona Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, In Sickness, Health, and 
Cyberspace: Protecting the Security of Electronic Private Health Information, 48 B.C. L 
REV. 06 (2007). Since we focus here on the role of payer innovation, we describe privacy 
rules as challenges for that innovation. Ideal solutions may be Pareto-superior by 
maintaining or increasing privacy while facilitating innovation, but may not always be 
available. One of us has begun to address such potential improvements in the context of 
medical datasets for complex computational modeling. See Roger A. Ford & W. Nicholson 
Price II, Privacy and Accountability in Black-Box Medicine (draft manuscript on file with 
authors). We do not here take a position on how best to balance privacy and innovation 
when they are strictly opposed.  
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Yet paradoxically these obstacles may enlarge the role of payers as 
custodians of health records in research as research consortia use distributed 
networks of data rather than central repositories to avoid triggering HIPAA 
violations. These arrangements are an opportunity for payers to expand their 
involvement in health research. At the same time, increased payer 
participation in innovation may minimize risks to patient privacy by 
reducing the need to transfer health records to entities that are not bound by 
the protective constraints of HIPAA. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Demand-side innovation by healthcare payers has tremendous potential 
to improve the healthcare system. Payers have access to large amounts of 
health data on millions of patients, and have the opportunity to develop new 
information about drug toxicity, comparative effectiveness of different 
treatments, and personalized medicine. Just as important, payers have 
substantially different incentives than the product-developing innovators 
that are more typically the target of innovation policy. As health costs 
continue to rise, innovation directed at frugality and efficiency becomes 
ever more crucial.  But encouraging innovation on the demand side may 
require very different policy tools than the standard exclusionary rights used 
to motivate firms to develop expensive new products. 
The barriers facing payer-innovators are substantial, including technical 
hurdles that impede aggregation and analysis of data as well as legal 
obstacles designed to protect patient privacy. The peculiar economic and 
legal landscape of the health care market may limit the ability of individual 
firms to capture the benefits of payer innovation, and the standard rewards 
of intellectual property are unlikely to help. However, a multi-pronged 
government approach is helping payer innovation move forward. A 
combination of funding and mandates for the use of electronic health 
records, engagement of stakeholders in building research networks, and 
modest changes to privacy rules are helping to make new research 
initiatives possible. While we applaud these efforts, there is more to be done 
to take advantage of the incentives and capabilities of payers as innovators. 
Meanwhile, scholars of innovation law and policy may find a fruitful, if 
largely unnoticed, target in demand-side innovation. 
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